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Common modulus attack against Lucas based El-Gamal Cryptosystem in the elliptic curve group over finite field


Citation

Koo, Lee Feng and Sarbini, Izzatul Nabila and Naning @ Zin, Fatin Hana and Kwan, Yee Min and Yiu, Pang Hung and Wong, Tze Jin (2018) Common modulus attack against Lucas based El-Gamal Cryptosystem in the elliptic curve group over finite field. International Journal of Cryptology Research, 8 (2). pp. 1-10. ISSN 0933-2790

Abstract

Common modulus attack is one of the various homomorphic attacks based on homomorphism nature of cryptosystems. This type of attack requires a plaintext encrypted under same modulus while two encryption keys are relatively prime to each other. In this paper, an investigation was carried out to evaluate the nature of a homomorphic attack on the Lucas based El-Gamal Cryptosystem in the elliptic curve group over finite field. The attack can be proven by using extend Euclidean algorithm together with composite and reverse functions of Lucas and Fibonacci sequences. Results showed that common modulus attack can be used to obtain the original plaintexts. Thus, it is dangerous to send a plaintext to two different users using same modulus. Sender must use different modulus to communicate with two different users.


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Additional Metadata

Item Type: Article
Divisions: Faculty of Agriculture and Food Sciences
Faculty of Computer Science and Information Technology
Institute for Mathematical Research
Publisher: International Association for Cryptologic Research
Keywords: Decryption; Encryption; Fibonacci Sequence; Lucas Sequence; Modulus
Depositing User: Ms. Nuraida Ibrahim
Date Deposited: 10 Nov 2020 07:24
Last Modified: 10 Nov 2020 07:24
URI: http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/73441
Statistic Details: View Download Statistic

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