Citation
Squires, Dale and Maunder, Mark and Allen, Robin and Andersen, Peder and Astorkiza, Kepa and Butterworth, Douglas and Caballero, Gonzalo and Clarke, Raymond and Ellefsen, Hans and Guillotreau, Patrice and Hampton, John and Hannesson, Rögnvaldur and Havice, Elizabeth and Helvey, Mark and Herrick Jr, Samuel and Hoydal, Kjartan and Maharaj, Vishwanie and Metzner, Rebecca and Mosqueira, Iago and Parma, Ana and Prieto‐Bowen, Ivan and Restrepo, Victor and Sidique, Shaufique Fahmi and Steinsham, Stein Ivar and Thunberg, Eric and del Valle, Ikerne and Vestergaard, Niels
(2017)
Effort rights-based management.
Fish and Fisheries, 18 (3).
440 - 465.
ISSN 1467-2960; ESSN: 1467-2979
Abstract
Effort rights-based fisheries management (RBM) is less widely used than catchrights, whether for groups or individuals. Because RBM on catch or effort necessar-ily requires a total allowable catch (TAC) or total allowable effort (TAE), RBM isdiscussed in conjunction with issues in assessing fish populations and providingTACs or TAEs. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages, and there aretrade-offs between the two approaches. In a narrow economic sense, catch rightsare superior because of the type of incentives created, but once the costs ofresearch to improve stock assessments and the associated risks of determining theTAC and costs of monitoring, control, surveillance and enforcement are taken intoconsideration, the choice between catch or effort RBM becomes more complex andless clear. The results will be case specific. Hybrid systems based on both catch andeffort are increasingly employed to manage marine fisheries to capture the advan-tages of both approaches. In hybrid systems, catch or effort RBM dominates and controls on the other supplements. RBM using either catch or effort by itselfaddresses only the target species stock externality and not the remaining externali-ties associated with by-catch and the ecosystem.
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