UPM Institutional Repository

Monitoring costs of MNC: an agency theory perspective.


Mustapha, Mazlina (2011) Monitoring costs of MNC: an agency theory perspective. In: International Conference of Global Academy of Business and Economic Research, 22-23 Dis 2011, Dubai, U.A.E. (pp. 118-133). (Unpublished)


This paper investigates the agency costs of multinational companies (MNC) in relation to agency theory in Malaysian business environment. Using the data of 235 MNCs, this study explores their demand for monitoring costs and these companies' preferences between the monitoring costs components. The data is collected using primary and secondary data. Multiple regression analysis and independent t-tests are conducted to analyze the data. The result indicates that multinational companies demand significantly higher monitoring costs compared to domestic companies. However, the relationship between these companies and their preference between the components of the monitoring mechanisms, that is between directorship and auditing as their monitoring mechanism is not significant. But when the auditing components are further investigated, it reveals that multinational companies would demand more external audit costs compared to internal audit costs. These results are supported by series of independent t-test which indicate that there are significant differences between the demands for monitoring of multinational companies as compared to their domestic counterparts.

Download File

ID 18820.pdf

Download (578kB) | Preview

Additional Metadata

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Subject: Multinational corporations - Congresses.
Subject: International business enterprises - Congresses.
Subject: International business enterprises - Finance - Management - Congresses.
Divisions: Faculty of Economics and Management
Keywords: Agency costs; Monitoring; MNC; Domestic companies.
Depositing User: Erni Suraya Abdul Aziz
Date Deposited: 16 Jul 2012 07:33
Last Modified: 07 Nov 2013 08:07
URI: http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/18820
Statistic Details: View Download Statistic

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item