



***A SUPER-PEER ARCHITECTURE TO IMPROVE INTRUSION DETECTION  
AND SCALABILITY IN COLLABORATIVE INTRUSION DETECTION  
NETWORK***

**YOUSEF ABDULLAH BAKHDLAGHI**

**FSKTM 2020 15**



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NETWORK**

By

**YOUSEF ABDULLAH BAKHDLAGHI**

**Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies, Universiti  
Putra Malaysia, in Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy**

**June 2020**

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Abstract of thesis presented to the Senate of Universiti Putra Malaysia in fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

**A SUPER-PEER ARCHITECTURE TO IMPROVE INTRUSION DETECTION AND SCALABILITY IN COLLABORATIVE INTRUSION DETECTION NETWORK**

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**June 2020**

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Collaborative intrusion detection network (CIDN) offers the ability to correlate suspicious activities from various collaborative intrusion detection systems (CIDSs) in different networks to maximize the efficiency of the intrusion detection by sharing the knowledge and resources among them which facilitates the discovery of large-scale and coordinated attacks. Although existing CIDN offers consultation capability for collaborators when a single CIDS lacks knowledge about a security event, it does not consider the collaborators' attack scopes when requesting for consultation which can result in consulting inexperienced peers and thus, degrade the efficiency of intrusion detection in CIDN and negatively affect the scalability of the CIDN, while in reality CIDSs have different strengths in various attack areas. In addition, fast-spreading attack (FSA) is one of the most serious threats in the networked environments that can infect hosts and propagate in an exponential rate in a short period of time. This type of attack might spread across the nodes and overwhelm the CIDN with consultation requests due to the lack of a mechanism to discover FSA from consultation requests in the CIDN. In fact, these consultation requests have not been utilized yet to detect FSA in existing CIDN architectures.

The aim of this study is to propose a scope-aware super-peer CIDN architecture as well as detecting FSA based on consultation requests that occur within CIDN. A statistical approach called exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) is

proposed with adaptive threshold to detect fast-spreading attacks (anomaly) in CIDN. The effectiveness of the proposed architecture has been evaluated through a discrete-event simulation under different intrusion detection measurements in terms of detection accuracy, FSA detection, and scalability with flexibility in adjusting simulation parameters to perform different test scenarios in the CIDN and compare the proposed super-peer CIDN architecture with the previous unstructured peer-to-peer architecture. Several simulation scenarios were performed for evaluating the performance of the proposed super-peer architecture. The simulation results demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed architecture and showed an improved performance in various intrusion detection metrics, including true-positive rate (TPR), true-negative rate (TNR), false-positive rate (FPR), false-negative rate (FNR), detection accuracy (DA), receiver operating characteristic (ROC), FSA detection, and overall scalability. In fact, nodes in the super-peer CIDN architecture are able to obtain more reliable feedbacks and thus, a better intrusion detection compared to the previous peer-to-peer CIDN architecture. Additionally, the FSA detection and FSA knowledge-base employment in the architecture has shown an improvement in consultation requests and feedbacks reduction and improve the scalability of the proposed architecture. Therefore, the super-peer architecture is a better solution for CIDN to strengthen the efficiency of intrusion detection as CIDN scales up as well as reducing the overload of unnecessary consultation requests and feedbacks among collaborators which contributes to effectively enhance the overall scalability of the architecture.

Abstrak tesis yang dikemukakan kepada Senat Universiti Putra Malaysia  
sebagai memenuhi keperluan untuk Ijazah Doktor Falsafah

**SENI BINA SUPER-RAKAN UNTUK MENINGKATKAN PENGESANAN  
PENCEROBOHAN DAN SKALABILITI DALAM RANGKAIAN  
PENGESANAN PENCEROBOHAN KOLABORATIF**

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Rangkaian pengesanan pencerobohan kolaboratif (CIDN) menawarkan keupayaan untuk menghubungkan aktiviti mencurigakan dari pelbagai sistem pengesanan pencerobohan kolaboratif (CIDS) dalam rangkaian yang berbeza untuk memaksimumkan kecekapan pengesanan pencerobohan dengan berkongsi pengetahuan dan sumber antara mereka yang memudahkan penemuan serangan berskala besar dan yang diselaraskan. Walaupun CIDN sedia ada menawarkan keupayaan perundingan untuk kolaborator ketika CIDS tunggal tidak memiliki pengetahuan tentang peristiwa keselamatan, ia tidak mempertimbangkan ruang lingkup serangan kolaborator ketika meminta perundingan yang dapat mengakibatkan konsultasi dengan rakan yang tidak pakar dan justeru, menurunkan kecekapan pengecaman pencerobohan CIDN dan secara negatifnya mempengaruhi skalabiliti CIDN, sedangkan pada kenyataannya CIDS mempunyai kekuatan yang berbeza dalam pelbagai kawasan serangan. Tambahan pula, serangan cepat menyebar (FSA) adalah salah satu ancaman paling serius dalam lingkungan jaringan yang boleh menjangkiti hos dan menyebarkan dengan kadar eksponen dalam jangka waktu yang singkat. Jenis serangan ini mungkin tersebar dalam kalangan nod dan membanjiri CIDN dengan permintaan perundingan akibat kurangnya mekanisme untuk menemukan FSA dari permintaan perundingan dalam CIDN. Malah, permintaan perundingan ini belum digunakan untuk mengesan FSA dalam seni bina CIDN sedia ada.

Tujuan kajian ini adalah untuk mengusulkan seni bina CIDN super-rakan yang peka skop serta mengesan FSA berdasarkan permintaan perundingan yang berlaku dalam CIDN. Pendekatan statistik yang disebut purata bergerak berwajaran eksponen (EWMA) diusulkan dengan ambang batas adaptif untuk mengesan serangan cepat menyebar (anomali) dalam CIDN. Keberkesanan seni bina yang dicadangkan ini telah dinilai melalui simulasi peristiwa diskrit di bawah pengukuran pengesanan pencerobohan yang berbeza dari segi ketepatan pengesanan, pengesanan FSA, dan skalabiliti dengan fleksibiliti dalam menyesuaikan parameter simulasi untuk melakukan senario ujian yang berbeza dalam CIDN dan membandingkan seni bina CIDN super-rakan yang dicadangkan dengan seni bina rakan-ke-rakan sebelumnya yang tidak berstruktur. Beberapa senario simulasi dilakukan untuk menilai prestasi seni bina super-rakan yang dicadangkan. Hasil simulasi menunjukkan kebolehlaksanaan seni bina yang dicadangkan dan menunjukkan peningkatan prestasi dalam pelbagai metrik pengesanan pencerobohan, termasuk kadar positif-benar (TPR), kadar negatif-benar (TNR), kadar positif-palsu (FPR), kadar negatif-palsu (FNR), ketepatan pengesanan (DA), ciri operasi penerima (ROC), pengesanan FSA, dan skalabiliti keseluruhan. Malah, nod dalam seni bina CIDN super-rakan berupaya memperoleh maklum balas yang lebih dipercayai dan dengan itu, menghasilkan pengesanan pencerobohan yang lebih baik berbanding dengan seni bina CIDN rakan-ke-rakan terdahulu. Selain itu, pengesanan FSA dan penggunaan berasaskan pengetahuan FSA dalam seni bina telah menunjukkan peningkatan dalam permintaan perundingan dan pengurangan maklum balas dan yang meningkatkan skalabiliti seni bina yang dicadangkan. Oleh itu, seni bina super-rakan adalah penyelesaian yang lebih baik bagi CIDN untuk memperkukuh kecekapan pengesanan pencerobohan ketika CIDN meningkat serta mengurangkan beban permintaan dan maklum balas perundingan yang tidak perlu dalam kalangan kolaborator yang menyumbang ke arah meningkatkan secara berkesan skalabiliti keseluruhan seni bina.

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## LIST OF NOTATIONS

$\mathcal{N}$	the set of all nodes
$ \mathcal{N} $	the number of nodes in set $\mathcal{N}$
$\mathcal{N}^j$	the nodes in group $j$ ( $\mathcal{N}^j \subseteq \mathcal{N}$ )
$\mathcal{D}$	the dataset of generated attacks
$ \mathcal{D} $	the number of records in set $\mathcal{D}$
$\bar{\mathcal{D}}$	dataset that includes $\mathcal{D}$ and fast-spreading according to $\alpha_1, \alpha_2$ parameters
$\mathcal{D}_k$	a subset of the dataset $\mathcal{D}$ ( $\mathcal{D}_k \subseteq \mathcal{D}$ ) that consists of all attack categories $k$
$ \mathcal{D}_k $	the number of records in subset $\mathcal{D}_k$
$\mathcal{S}^j$	represents fast-spreading attack knowledge in group $j$ ( $\mathcal{S}^j \subseteq \mathcal{D}_k$ )
$ \mathcal{S}^j $	the number of records in subset $\mathcal{S}^j$ , where $ \mathcal{S}^j  = a_1 \times  \mathcal{D}_k $
$N$	the number of nodes in the CIDN
$Y$	holds feedbacks from nodes
$\delta(Y)$	the decision based on feedbacks $Y$
$\lambda$	the intensity of interarrival time in Piosson process
$A$	interarrival time
$t$	current simulation time, $t_0 = 0, t_1 = t_0 + A_1$
$p$	success (attack) rate in Bernoulli process
$k$	an attack category
$m$	the number of groups in the CIDN
$n$	the number of nodes in each group
$a_1$	the percentage of which fast-spreading attacks are generated from the records in each group $\mathcal{S}^j$ , where $ \mathcal{S}^j  = a_1 \times  \mathcal{D}_k $ and $k \in$ group $j$
$a_2$	the percentage of $\mathcal{S}^j$ to consider for reoccurrence
$x$	the number of reoccurrence of an attack
$c$	a consultation request
$d$	a record from the dataset $\mathcal{D}$

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAWP	Analytical Active Worm Propagation
C2	Command and Control
CIA	Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability
CIDN	Collaborative Intrusion Detection Network
CIDS	Collaborative Intrusion Detection System
CR	Consultation Request
DA	Detection Accuracy
DoS	Denial-of-service Attack
EWMA	Exponentially Weighted Moving Average
FN	False Negative
FNR	False Negative Rate
FP	False Positive
FPR	False Positive Rate
FSA	Fast-spreading Attack
HIDS	Host-based Intrusion Detection System
IDMEF	Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format
IDS	Intrusion Detection System
MITM	Man-in-the-middle Attack
MV	Majority Vote
NIDS	Network-based Intrusion Detection System
P2P	Peer-to-peer
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
RFC	Request for Comments
ROC	Receiver Operating Characteristic
SP	Super-peer
SSJ	Stochastic Simulation in Java
STIX	Structured Threat Information Expression
TN	True Negative
TNR	True Negative Rate
TP	True Positive
TPR	True Positive Rate

## GLOSSARY OF TERMS

#	Term	Definition
1	Confusion Matrix	A table to visualize the performance of intrusion detection that distinguish the normal and malicious instances in both, actuality, and predicted results (Hamed et al., 2017).
2	Cyber-attack	Cyber-attack is a malicious attempt that targets information systems, computers, computer networks, or infrastructures, aims at disrupting the CIA triad (Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability) of information security (Narwal et al., 2019).
3	Exploit	A piece of code that takes advantage of a single or multiple vulnerabilities (Stallings and Brown, 2018).
4	Intrusion Detection	A security service that monitors and analyzes system events for the purpose of finding, and providing real-time or near real-time warning of, attempts to access system resources in an unauthorized manner (Stallings and Brown, 2018).
5	Malicious Code	Refers to malware or malicious software which includes viruses, worms, and any software that its purpose is to attack a platform (Nieles et al., 2017).
6	Malware	Malware is a term for all malicious software or code that is specifically designed to gain access or cause damage to a device or a computer network, usually without the victim's knowledge.
7	Node	In graph theory, a node is the fundamental unit that forms the graph. Nodes are connected by a communication network that collaborate to perform specific tasks (Erciyes, 2013). In this thesis, the terms peer, super-peer, CIDS, and collaborators are interchangeably referring to node.

<b>8</b>	Receiver Operating Characteristics	A graphical plot that illustrates the trade-off between true positive rate (TPR) against false positive rate (FPR) (Powers, 2011).
<b>9</b>	Security Compromise	A security violation of a system that potentially could leave the system exposed to unauthorized access or attack (Shirey, 2007).
<b>10</b>	Security Event	An occurrence in a system, service, or network that is relevant to security (Shirey, 2007).
<b>11</b>	Security Incident	A security event that may indicates a violation of information, computer, or network security (Shirey, 2007).
<b>12</b>	Security Intrusion	A security event, or a combination of security events, that from a security incident in which an intruder gains, or attempts to gain, access to a system or system resource without having authorization to do so (Stallings and Brown, 2018).
<b>13</b>	Vulnerability	A term that refers to a flaw or weakness in a computer system that potentially could leave the system exposed to attacks (Symantec, 2019).

# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Motivation

Technology has changed our way of communication and revolutionized our lives in ways that eliminate time and distance barriers with its continuous advances over years. There is no doubt that the usage of Internet for online transactions has been raised dramatically and become an integral part of people's life across the globe. Unfortunately, this potentially expose people's online activities (including governments, banks, and organizations online services) to hackers who have malicious intentions to gain access, destruct, or make a profit from such intrusions.

An alarming report from Risk Based Security (RBS, 2019) shows how the number of disclosed vulnerabilities has increased noticeably in the past five years (Figure 1.1).




Figure 1.1: The Number of Vulnerabilities Disclosed, 2014-2018 (RBS, 2019)

These vulnerabilities give a sign of growing threats that require continuous improvements and developments of countermeasure systems. In particular, more than 22,000 security vulnerabilities were disclosed in 2018 and 2019; 33% of the disclosed vulnerabilities in 2018 are rated as severe (RBS, 2019). In fact, the cost of cybercrime is estimated to grow annually from \$3 trillion in 2015 to \$6 trillion by the end of 2021 (K. Huang et al., 2018). Consequently, cybersecurity remains a complex challenge for businesses and end-users worldwide in the Internet (Thames, 2014).

Figure 1.2 shows the growing threat of cyber-attacks in Malaysia from year 2005 to 2018, according to reported incidents to Malaysia Computer Emergency Response Team (MyCERT, 2019). In fact, the number of the reported incidents has increased remarkably for the past 15 years.

The importance of combating cyber-attacks and intrusions has led researchers to develop a collaboration between IDS to extend a single IDS's detection capability for discovering new threats and attacks. As a result, collaborative intrusion detection network (CIDN) has been introduced to address that.

Collaborative intrusion detection network (CIDN) offers the ability to correlate suspicious activities from various collaborative intrusion detection systems (CIDSs) in different networks to maximize the efficiency of the intrusion detection in addition to sharing knowledge and resources among them to facilitate the discovery of large-scale and coordinated attacks (Li and Kwok, 2019) (Vasilomanolakis et al., 2015). CIDN falls into two categories: information-based and consultation-based CIDN. The information-based CIDN allows collaborators to share their knowledge and observation. It enables an IDS to alert others about intrusions and attacks. On the other hand, consultation-based CIDN is an on-demand collaboration that is used when an IDS lacks knowledge and confidence about a suspicious activity or a security event (Vasilomanolakis et al., 2015) (Fung and Boutaba, 2013).

As cyber-attacks become large-scaled and more destructive, defending against such attacks is extremely important which requires further security approaches to countermeasure such attacks. One promising approach that extends a single IDS's capability is the CIDN. This approach allows an IDS to collaborate with multiple intrusion detection systems for knowledge-sharing and better intrusion detection.






Figure 1.2: The Number of Reported Cyber Incidents in Malaysia, 2005-2018

The field of collaborative security, including intrusion detection, is attracting more attention recently with continuous efforts to enhance the collaboration and intrusion detection, but “*the success of collaborative security relies on not only its ability to address the challenges of traditional security but also the accuracy and efficiency of security analysis*” (G. Meng et al., 2015). Yet, there is no scalable solution in the literature for carrying out collaborative intrusion detection in large networks (Vasilomanolakis et al., 2015). Consequently, the necessity for continuous enhancement of intrusion detection and IDS’s collaboration capabilities is the motivation for this research.

## 1.2 Problem Statement

Existing consultation-based CIDN architecture does not address the scope variations of CIDSs. Consulting nodes without considering scope variations could affect the efficiency of the CIDN and increase the overload of unnecessary consultation requests to inexpert peers which poses scalability issues as the CIDN scales up. Additionally, there is no mechanism in the existing consultation-based CIDN to monitor these consultation requests for the presence of fast-spreading attacks (FSA).

Particularly, this thesis addresses the following issues:

1. Current consultation-based CIDN does not address the variations of CIDSs scopes, consulting nodes without considering their scope variations could degrade the efficiency of the CIDN, and increase the overload of unnecessary consultation requests to inexpert peers, requesting and responding, which affects the decision made by a CIDS as well as affecting the overall scalability of the architecture. Additionally, there is no scalable solution in the literature for carrying out collaborative intrusion detection in large networks (Vasilomanolakis et al., 2015).
2. One of the most serious threats in the networked environments is fast-spreading attacks. This kind of attacks have a self-propagation capabilities that can infect hosts and propagate in an exponential rate, affecting millions of hosts in a short period of time (Bardhan et al., 2019) (Boukerche and Zhang, 2019) (O’Brien, 2017) (Lan Liu et al., 2017) (Dua and Du, 2016) (S. Chen et al., 2014). Existing CIDN offers consultation capability without having a mechanism to monitor

these consultation requests for detecting FSA. However, consultation requests from several CIDSs for the same security event in a short period of time could be a sign of FSA that if not detected, the same attack might spread and target other nodes, which can affect the intrusion detection and the scalability of the CIDN. Also, existing consultation requests within CIDN have not been utilized yet to discover such attacks.

### **1.3 Research Objectives**

The main research objective of this research is to propose a super-peer collaborative intrusion detection network (CIDN) for better intrusion detection and scalability.

The detailed objectives are:

1. to propose a scope-aware architecture to increase the efficiency and scalability of CIDN by organizing CIDN peers into groups based on their scope to reduce unnecessary consultation requests sent to inexpert peers and facilitate obtaining initial peers list and updates.
2. to propose a mechanism for detecting fast-spreading attacks for the proposed super-peer CIDN architecture and prevent the spreading of fast spreading attacks and enhance detection accuracy and scalability.

### **1.4 Research Scope**

This research focuses on enhancing the scalability and the efficiency of consultation-based collaborative intrusion detection network (CIDN) which evaluated through stochastic simulation method that acquired data from statistical distributions and mathematical models. However, the decision when to consult, the communication between collaborators, insider attacks and attacks against the CIDN itself are not covered in this research scope.

## 1.5 Research Contributions

The major contribution of this research is the proposal of a super-peer collaborative intrusion detection network (CIDN) architecture to enhance intrusion detection efficiency and scalability of the CIDN.

The detailed contributions of this research are:

1. A new scalable super-peer CIDN architecture that contribute to enhance detection accuracy and scalability as well as facilitating FSA detection in the architecture. Simulations show remarkable improvements in detection accuracy and scalability comparing to existing peer-to-peer CIDN.
2. A mechanism to detect fast-spreading attacks (FSA) for super-peer collaborative intrusion detection network (CIDN) using statistical anomaly detection method (EWMA) to monitor the intensity of consultation requests in CIDN that reflects FSA. This mechanism has shown an enhancement to detection accuracy, intrusion detection and scalability.

## 1.6 Thesis Organization

This thesis is organized in eight chapters as follows:

**Chapter 1** provides an outline of the study, including research background, motivation, problem statement, research objectives, research scope and research contributions.

**Chapter 2** presents an overview of cyber-attacks, intrusion detection, and collaborative intrusion detection. Then, reviews the related work and challenges in both collaborative intrusion detection networks (CIDN) and statistical-based anomaly detection, finding gaps and limitations in existing work.

**Chapter 3** elaborates the methodology used in this research including requirement analysis, designing the proposed architecture, simulation design, and evaluation. It investigates the current CIDN limitations, find the gaps and propose the solution. Then, provides the simulation design, evaluation criteria and result analysis for the proposed solution.

**Chapter 4** describes the proposed scope-aware super-peer collaborative intrusion detection network (CIDN) architecture in detail. A comprehensive description of its components and organization are provided.

**Chapter 5** presents the proposed mechanism for detecting fast-spreading attacks in the consultation-based CIDN through statistical-based anomaly detection to detect the intensity of consultation requests.

**Chapter 6** focuses on the simulation design and evaluation of the proposed architecture in terms of detection accuracy and scalability. A discrete-event simulation is used to evaluate the super-peer CIDN architecture and compare it to unstructured peer-to-peer CIDN architecture using various statistical distribution, such as Poisson and Bernoulli distribution that assist in the architecture evaluation.

**Chapter 7** illustrates the performance evaluation of the super-peer CIDN architecture and the fast-spreading attacks detection based on various evaluation criteria described in Chapter 3.

**Chapter 8** concludes the entire thesis with highlights on its findings of the proposed architecture and recommends some potential future work of this research.

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