



UNIVERSITI PUTRA MALAYSIA

**PARTICIPATION OF CIVILIAN JOINT TASK FORCE IN COMBATING
BOKO HARAM IN YOBE STATE, NIGERIA**

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**PARTICIPATION OF CIVILIAN JOINT TASK FORCE IN COMBATING
BOKO HARAM IN YOBE STATE, NIGERIA**

By

MODU LAWAN GANA

**Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies, Universiti Putra Malaysia,
in Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

June 2019

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to the blessed memory of my son Lawan Gana who passed away in 2018 in his fourth birth year while I am doing this research. I know Allah has not let you to see the fruit of my struggle, but I know the creator love you more than we do. I pray Allah to make you be the door opener of our eternal life in the hereafter. You are constantly in my heart and prayers and hope that you should be proud of me in the heaven.



Abstract of thesis presented to the Senate of Universiti Putra Malaysia in fulfilment
of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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June 2019

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Faculty : Human Ecology

Since 2009, counterinsurgency approaches of the Nigerian government for combating Boko Haram insurgent group are ineffective. Therefore, the insurgent group continued to cause severe security challenge to the country. The insurgent has killed nearly 30,000 people and over two million people displaced as internally displaced persons and refugees. Even though the government measures are ineffective, the participation of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) substantially reduced the violence both in terms of attack frequencies and fatalities rate in communities. This study therefore analysed the participation of the CJTF in combating Boko Haram in Yobe State Nigeria. The study was carried out based on four objectives. The first objective determined the strategy used by the CJTF in combating the Boko Haram. The second objective examined the motivations that triggered the participation of people in the CJTF. The third objective identified the challenges of the CJTF, whereas the fourth objective determined the factors that interested the Yobe state government to incorporate the CJTF as a local security agent. The study was conducted on a qualitative method, and the design was a case study. The empirical data were collected through the techniques of interview and non-participant observation. The interviews were conducted with thirteen informants from three groups comprising members of the CJTF, community/traditional leaders, and government officials in the study area. The finding showed that the CJTF uses three strategies in combating Boko Haram comprising informational, target-hardening, and conventional strategies. The study also found that the interest of defending the community, inadequate protection by the state, and repressive state actions are the motivations triggering the participation of people in the CJTF. The finding also showed that operational, motivational and organizational issues are the challenges hindering the combating activities of the group. Concerning the incorporation of the CJTF, the finding showed that the willingness of regulating the CJTF, fostering post-insurgency stability, and tackling the challenges of regular securities are the main interests of the government. The study recommends an urgent need for the Nigerian government to re-strategize its

counterinsurgency operation to focus on the population-centric approach. Moreover, to ensure long-time stability, the government should adopt adequate measures of addressing socioeconomic issues of poverty, unemployment, and illiteracy that are providing the fertile ground for the escalation of the insurgency in the country.



Abstrak tesis yang dikemukakan kepada senat Universiti Putra Malaysia sebagai memenuhi keperluan untuk Ijazah Doktor Falsafah

**PENYERTAAN PASUKAN PETUGAS GABUNGAN AWAM DALAM
MEMERANGI BOKO HARAM DI NEGERI YOBE, NIGERIA**

Oleh

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Sejak tahun 2009, pendekatan penumpasan pemberontakan oleh kerajaan Nigeria untuk memerangi Boko Haram adalah tidak berkesan. Hasilnya, kumpulan pemberontak berkenaan terus menjadi cabaran keselamatan yang serius kepada negara. Kumpulan pemberontak berkenaan telah membunuh hampir 30,000 orang dan lebih dari dua juta orang kehilangan tempat tinggal dan menjadi pelarian. Walaupun langkah-langkah kerajaan tidak berkesan, penyertaan Pasukan Petugas Gabungan Awam (CJTF) telah berjaya mengurangkan keganasan secara signifikan dari segi kekerapan serangan dan kadar kematian dalam komuniti. Oleh itu, kajian ini menganalisis penyertaan pasukan petugas gabungan awam dalam memerangi Boko Haram di negeri Yobe, Nigeria. Kajian ini dijalankan berdasarkan empat objektif. Objektif pertama ditentukan strategi yang digunakan oleh CJTF dalam memerangi Boko Haram. Objektif kedua diperiksa motivasi yang mencetuskan penyertaan orang ramai dalam CJTF. Objektif ketiga mengenal pasti cabaran-cabaran CJTF, manakala objektif keempat ditentukan faktor-faktor yang menyebabkan kerajaan negeri Yobe berminat untuk memasukkan CJTF sebagai agen keselamatan tempatan. Kajian ini dijalankan berdasarkan kaedah kualitatif, dan reka bentuknya adalah kajian kes. Data empirikal dikumpulkan melalui teknik temu bual dan pemerhatian bukan peserta. Temu bual itu dijalankan dengan tiga belas informan dari tiga kumpulan yang terdiri daripada ahli-ahli CJTF, pemimpin masyarakat/tradisional, dan pegawai kerajaan di kawasan kajian. Dapatan kajian menunjukkan bahawa CJTF menggunakan tiga strategi dalam memerangi Boko Haram yang terdiri daripada strategi penerangan, strategi pemetaan, dan strategi konvensional. Kajian ini juga mendapati bahawa kepentingan mempertahankan masyarakat, perlindungan yang tidak mencukupi oleh kerajaan, dan penindasan negara adalah motivasi yang mendorong penyertaan orang ramai dalam CJTF. Dapatan kajian ini juga menunjukkan bahawa masalah operasi, motivasi, dan organisasi merupakan cabaran yang menghalang aktiviti memerangi kumpulan pemberontak berkenaan. Mengenai penubuhan CJTF, dapatan kajian menunjukkan bahawa kesediaan untuk mengawal selia CJTF, memupuk kestabilan

pasca pemberontakan, dan menangani cabaran untuk menjamin keselamatan adalah kepentingan utama pemerintah. Kajian ini mencadangkan keperluan mendesak bagi kerajaan Nigeria untuk menstruktur semula operasi penumpasan pemberontakan untuk memberikan tumpuan kepada pendekatan berpusatkan penduduk. Selain itu, untuk memastikan kestabilan jangka panjang, kerajaan harus mengambil langkah-langkah yang mencukupi untuk menangani masalah sosioekonomis seperti kemiskinan, pengangguran, dan buta huruf yang menyediakan platform yang subur untuk meningkatkan pemberontakan di negara ini.



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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACLED	Armed Conflict Locator and Event Data
ACLED	Armed Conflict Locator and Event Data
AO	Area of Operation
AQIM	African Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
AQIM	African Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
CBAGs	Community Base Armed Groups
CBDGs	Community Base Defence Groups
C-H-C-D	Clear-Hold –Consolidate- Develop
CJTF	Civilian Joint Task Force
CLEEN	Centre Law Enforcement Education in Nigeria
COOPI	Cooperazione Internazionale
CPM	Communist Party of Malaya
CSDF	Civilian Self Defence Force
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African State Military Organization
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EOKA	Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionairias de Columbia
FELCRA	Federal Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority
FELDA	Federal Land Development Authority
FM-3-24	United States Army and Marine Field Manual
HRW	Human Right Watch
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IED	Improvised Explosive Device

ISR	Intelligence Service Reconnaissance
LRA	Lord Resistance Army
MCP	Malayan Communist Party
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force
MUJAO	Movement for Oneness of Jihad in Africa
NOC	National Operation Council
NREGA	National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
NSAGs	Non-State Armed Groups
NSC	National Security Council
PGMs	Pro-Government Militias
PKK	Kurdish Peoples' Party
PMs	Pro-Government Militias
PRC	Peoples' Republic of China
RISDAR	Rubber Industry Smallholders Development Authority
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SJTF	Special Joint Task Force
SOI	Sons of Iraq
SPLA	Sudan People Liberation Army
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNJHRO	United Nations Joint Human Right Office
USIP	United States Institute for Peace

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

In recent times, the rapid growth and escalation of insurgent violence permeating national and international borders have raised concerns among international actors on its threats on global peace and security. Whereas interstate warfare has diminished since the end of the Second World War, insurgency appeared as the most disastrous global challenge in the 21st century. By the year 2001, aside from the only interstate conflict between India and Pakistan over the oil-rich Kashmir region (Gleditsch et al, 2002), instate warfare is extremely a rarity. To date, most wars are fight on intrastate basis mainly between the sovereign state and the insurgent guerillas. In 2014 alone according to indices by Global Terrorism Index (2014), a terrorism database at the Institute of Economics and Peace, about 100 countries are fighting an insurgency in their respective territories. Moreover, Gleditsch et al (2002) documented the existence of 225 guerilla conflicts in about 28 countries in the year 2001. This statistic has been kept growing as new cases of insurgent violence continue to record across many borders.

The unprecedented growth of the insurgency is also accompanied with colossal damages of human and material assets on both the states and civilians. In 2001, some source shows insurgent violent are responsible for over 1000 deaths (Global Terrorism Index, 2015). A recent index by the Global Terrorism Index (2017) shows violent insurgency has left about 26,000 deaths, together with the displacement of millions of people as internally displaced persons and refugees. There is a general belief that insurgency is the most serious catastrophe of the 21st century.

In Nigeria, the ravaging violent by the Boko Haram insurgent group in the northern region appeared as the country's major security threats in recent time. The insurgents aimed is to abolish the secular political system of the Nigeria state and replaced it with an Islamic system that can be administered through strict compliance with the Islamic scriptures of the Qur'an and Hadith, the holy books of Islam. Since the eruption of the Boko Haram in 2009, it frequented attacks on government establishments, worship centers, the office building of foreign nations, and international organizations has caused catastrophic damages both on the sovereign state and on the teeming population of Nigeria. Although to date, authoritative estimates of the social and economic damages incurred on both the state and the citizenry are scarce, because most of the insurgent infected areas are inaccessible, however, some accounts have indicated that over 30,000 people were brutally murdered (Oyowele, 2016; Onuoha and Oyowele, 2018). Official data of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees revealed that over 2 million people are forcedly displaced both within and across the Nigeria's border (UNHCR, 2016).

Reflecting on the damages of the insurgent Boko Haram, Onuoha, and Oyowele (2018) indicated that over one million houses mostly belonging to the citizens were destroyed. Most of the destroyed properties are not repairable. According to Perouse de Montclos (2014), a researcher at the combating terrorism center, Boko Haram adopted a foreign jihadist tactic such as suicide bombing and kidnapping for ransom. This category of armed violence crisis is generally unknown to the Nigeria security history.

Moreover, with the accelerated growth of the insurgent and unabated destructions of basic social and economic infrastructures, Boko Haram has caused an alarming humanitarian situation in Nigeria. A report published by world refugee agency 'United Nations High Commission for Refugees' [UNHCR] (2015) revealed that over 90% of the population affected by the Boko Haram insurgency are in desperate humanitarian situations. Whereas the United Nations International Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF) 2016 report indicated that about 90% of the displaced population in the Nigeria north-east are living in a dilapidated shelter, majority of which are hosted by a segment of the world's poorest population. The world humanitarian agency further scored the displacement trend induced by the Boko Haram group as one of the fastest growing displacement crises in Africa. Perhaps, due to the persistent threats posted by the insurgent, many analysts have equated the Boko Haram to Nigeria's 30 months civil war in the 1970s (Bello, 2013; Onapajo and Usman, 2015). In fact, President Goodluck Jonathan described the Boko Haram threat as worse than the Nigeria civil war (Solomon, 2012).

However, the destructions patterns of the Boko Haram group was recorded simultaneously with the concerted counterinsurgency measures taken by the Nigeria federal government, state governments of the affected zone, including foreign nations. In its effort of combating the insurgency, the Nigeria government besides the deployment of sizeable number of its armed securities (Folade, 2016), there are several political-legal measures taken among which includes the declaration of the state of emergency as well as enactment of counterterrorism laws (Agbiboa, 2014; Aghedo & Osumah, 2014; Olojo, 2012; Pham Pham, 2014; Bello, 2013). Disturbingly, in most respect, the government measures have not undermined the violent impetus of the insurgency. Some authors have contended that rather than degrading the Boko Haram violence, government counterinsurgency measures further promoted the insurgency to full-scale national security crisis (Olanwareju et al, 2017; Nwankpa, 2016). The enormity of the insurgency has since risen the need for an alternate strategy of combating the Boko Haram group.

Nevertheless, in spite of the persistent ineffectiveness of the government measures including the SJTF and MNJTF engagements, the participation of an informal civilian self-defense group called Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in 2013 in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states resulted in some remarkable successes. The CJTF have influenced the reduction of the Boko Haram hostilities in most of the communities (Omenma and Hendricks, 2018). The group whose participation was voluntary has its members people from different walks of lives such as hunters, farmers, carpenters,

traders, including retired security operatives (Hassan and Pieri, 2018; Bamidele, 2013). Although, while there is inadequate empirical data revealing the actual size of the CJTF participants, however, some conservative accounts have indicated that there are approximately 16,000 participants across the six states (Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Taraba, Bauchi and Gome) comprising of the Nigeria's northeast (Bamidele, 2016). There is however larger presences of the participants in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states worst affected by the insurgency.

Interestingly, since the participation, the CJTF has rendered serious setbacks to the rampaging violence of the Boko Haram in many communities (Bamidele, 2016). It succeeded reduced both attack frequencies and fatalities in many communities, including in Maiduguri the spiritual home of the Boko Haram (Chukwuma, 2017). Moreover, members of the CJTF are pointed out instrumental in conquering many towns and villages occupied by the Boko Haram fighters, as well as helped rescued many captives among which includes some of the abducted schoolgirls in Chibok town of the restive Borno State. In fact, since 2013, the account of successes of the CJTF continued to flourish. This has propelled a general belief that the strategy of the CJTF is a suitable option for the Nigeria government to be adopted for terminating the Boko Haram violence.

Nevertheless, even as there is a growing interest to investigate the combating strategy of the CJTF, to date; evolving scholarly works have not adequately addressed this perspective. Most of the prevailing studies on Nigeria's counterinsurgencies focused on the analysis of the government approaches in combating the Boko Haram (Weararatne, 2016; Ani, 2014; Aliyu et al, 2015; Cook, 2014; Higazi, 2013; Sulemana, 2014). However, where studies on the CJTF is obtainable, the focus is majorly on the analysis of the overwhelming successes of the group (Bamidele, 2016; Chukwuma, 2017; Agbiboa, 2015a; 2018; Al-Efendi and Gumel, 2015; Kolo, 2014; Dan-Azumu, 2018). Most of these authors have given limited attention to the investigation of the strategy that translated to the purported successes of the CJTF. This study, therefore, intends to determine the combating strategy of the CJTF that influence its successes. The case study will be conducted in Yobe state, Nigeria. In fact, Yobe state is the first to experience the violent uprising of the Boko Haram as well as the birthplace of Mohammed Yusuf and Abubakar Shekau, the founder and the notorious commander of the Boko Haram respectively (Omenma and Hendricks, 2018). The state, therefore, is the first states to witnessed the participation of the people in the CJTF group.

1.2 Statement of Problem

Since 2009, counterinsurgency strategies by the Nigeria government for combating Boko Haram insurgent group are not effective. The Boko Haram whose violent campaign is to overthrow the secular political system of Nigeria and constitute Islamic state continued to cause catastrophic damages to the citizenry and undermined the sovereignty of the Nigeria state. Among other counterinsurgency strategies by Nigerian government including the formation of Special Joint Task Force, and other

political-legal measures such as the declaration of a state of emergency and the enactment of counterterrorism laws (Bappah, 2016).

Moreover, the formation and subsequent deployment of nearly 9000 Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) troops by the member states of Lake Chad Basin Commission (Nigeria, Chad, Cameroun, Niger, and Benin Republics) to aid the Nigeria SJTF to combat the Boko Haram in cross-border pursuit has not been successful in combating the insurgency. In fact, despite these concerted measures by the government, Boko Haram have brutally murdered over 30,000 people (Allen, 2017; Onuoha & Oyowele, 2018), and over 2 million people displaced as internally displaced persons and refugees (UNHCR, 2015). The insurgent group has also violently seized and consolidated control of swathes of territorial land approximated at 20,000 km² (Agbiboa 2015; Abdulazeez, 2016; Pham and Pham, 2016); a land mass estimated to be equal to the size of Belgium. Moreover, in 2014, the Global Terrorism Index (2014); a terrorism database at the Institute for Economic and Peace scored the Boko Haram as the deadliest terrorist group in the world. In fact, some authors have contended that rather than combating the insurgency, counterinsurgency measures by the government further degenerated the Boko Haram to full-scale national security crises (Olanwareju, 2017; Nwankpa, 2016). Challenged by the interminable violence of the Boko Haram, the then Nigeria President Goodluck Jonathan described the insurgency as the most serious collective security threat in Nigeria.

However, whereas Boko Haram have resisted the government measures including both the military and the political approaches, the participation of informal local defense forces, known as Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) to volunteer in combating the Boko Haram succeeded to degraded the insurgent menaces in many communities. The participation of the CJTF succeeded in reducing both attack frequencies and fatalities of the Boko Haram. One comparative analysis of the Boko Haram violence in the pre-CJTF period (2009-2013) and post-CJTF participation period (2013-2017) indicated that the attack frequencies of the Boko Haram have reduced by over half since the participation of the CJTF group (Omenma and Hendricks, 2018). For instance, in the pre-CJTF period, Omenma and Hendricks (2018) indicated that the mean (M) attack rate and standard deviation (SD) before CJTF participation is 11.83 and 4.92 respectively. However, after the participation of the CJTF in the counterinsurgency operation, the mean (M) attack rate and the standard deviation (SD) witnessed an accelerated reduction to 5.19 and 4.25 respectively. In the most recent period, the CJTF was pointed out responsible for nearly 60% of the counterinsurgency mercenaries in Nigeria's northeast (Hassan, 2015). Hassan (2015) further claimed that the CJTF might become an effective alternative to the government's SJTF, which has been accused of gross violations of rights and ineffective operation.

Furthermore, besides the reduction of the attack frequencies, the informal group was pointed out instrumental for conquering many towns and villages occupied by the Boko Haram fighters, as well as pointed out instrumental for the rescues of hundreds of captives from the Boko Haram group. In March 2014, for instance, the members of the CJTF conquered Mafa, a town located about 50 km from the metropolitan town of

Maiduguri, the command office of the Nigeria army Special Joint Task Force (SJTF) combating the Boko Haram group (Bamidele, 2017). Importantly, among the rescued captives by the CJTF includes some of the abducted schoolgirls in Chibok town of Borno state. In fact, since the abduction of the girls in April 2014, the rescue operations by both the Nigeria government and international collaborations with the powerful states such as with Great Britain, USA, Russia, and France have not been successful. The civilian force has also helped identify several Boko Haram fighters shielded by some local population. The CJTF have demonstrated themselves as an incredible informal anti-terrorist group fighting an opponent with large and sophisticated weapons of mass destruction.

Disturbingly, in spite of the purported successes of the CJTF, there is however growing accusation in many quarters in Nigeria that the participation of the CJTF was triggered by divergent motivations. Some authors have indicated that the militia group can politicize its activities while influences accelerated state failure (Benraad, 2011). The massive participation of people in spite of the attendant risk has heightened the concern about the motivations behind the participation of the people. To date, some estimates have shown that about 600 CJTF participants' are brutally killed and hundreds of others wounded by the Boko Haram group (Oyewole and Onuoha, 2018). The CJTF was alleged to have provoked reprisal attacks from the Boko Haram leading to huge loss of lives and destructions of civil properties. In fact, arising from these undue threats and the unclear motivations of the participants, there is increasing fear among the public and the members of the academics that the CJTF may erupt to challenge the sovereign existence of the Nigeria state. Reflecting on this assertion, Bamidele, (2016) described the CJTF as a time bomb. Moreover, the International Crisis Group country report in 2016 indicated that the CJTF would be worse than the Boko Haram group (ICC, 2016).

Consequently, despite the increasing concern about the legality of the CJTF operation and the supposed motivations for its participation, the informal group was earning support from the Nigeria government. Most of the state governments in the Nigeria northeast are offering financial and logistic support for the CJTF operation. In Yobe State, the group was co-opted as an informal security force. The state government has been offering financial and logistic support in the form of vehicles and other materials to the CJTF in appreciation of its role in checking the activities of the insurgents. The government also offered employment to hundreds of CJTF for counterinsurgency duties (Bamidele, 2016). Perhaps, the increasing support the members of the CJTF are receiving from the government has been a potent issue of concern among many Nigeria populations.

Nevertheless, amidst the widespread concern about the CJTF group and the supposed motivations for the participation of people in the group, observers have argued that with the ineffectiveness of the government measures, the strategy of the CJTF is an alternate option for the Nigeria government to end the Boko Haram menace (Hassan and Pieri, 2018). Moreover, Bamidele (2016) have argued that the CJTF is suitable communal security strategy, however, it is underutilize in the Nigeria context. There

is general believe that the underutilization of the CJTF strategy by the government emanated largely from inadequate empirical data analyzing the groups' strategy and the motivations triggering participation of people in the group.

However, whereas the interest to investigate the strategy of the CJTF and the motivations triggering participations of people is receiving public and scholarly attentions, disturbingly, the existing works have not adequately addressed these perspectives. In fact, most of the prevailing works on the Nigeria counterinsurgency concentrated majorly on the analysis of the combating measures of the government (Abdulazeez, 2016; Jacob and Akpan, 2015; Mbah & Nwangwu, 2014; Folade, 2016; Fatile & Ejalonibu, 2014; Amao & Maiangwa, 2017), and on the security issues associated with CJTF participation (ICC, 2017; Amnesty International, 2015). However, where studies on the CJTF are obtainable, the focuses are majorly on the analysis of the combating successes of the group (Bamidele, 2016; Bamidele, 2017; Omenma & Hendricks, 2018; Dan-Zuma, & Azeez, 2018; Chukwuma, 2017; Agbiboa, 2015). Therefore, to date, limited scholarly attention was given to the perspective of the combating strategy of the CJTF and the motivations triggering participation of people in the group. This study intends to address these perspectives.

The main issue to be address by this study therefore are three. The first is to investigate the combating strategy of the CJTF, the second is to examine the motivation triggering the participation of people in the CJTF group, and the third is to determine the factors interest Yobe state government to incorporate the CJTF as local security agents. The aim of the study besides contributing to addresses the scholarly gap in the literature; the findings should have practical benefits for the policymakers in Nigeria and other countries facing similar insurgency rebellion around the world.

This study should be conducted at Geidam in Yobe State, Nigeria. Yobe State is one of the three worst affected states (Borno, Yobe and Adamawa) by the Boko Haram insurgency. However besides the unprecedented loss of lives and valuable properties, the state moreover emerged as the birth place of the founding fathers of the Boko Haram group (Mohamed Yusuf and Abubakar Shekau). It is also the first to experience the violent rebellion of the insurgent group before its escalation to other places and countries. Moreover, Geidam locality is among the notable areas in Yobe State that has the history of the frequented attacks of the Boko Haram group. The town is also among the localities with higher concentration and active participation of the people in the CJTF group.

Thus, in addressing the aforementioned issues, this thesis argued that the combating strategy of the CJTF is based on the population-centric approach that claimed successful counterinsurgency is determined by the democratic isolation of the insurgent group from the population. This type of the isolation according to Galula (1964) is not enforces on the population, but ensured through the cooperation and popular support of the local population. To achieve its stated objectives, the research is guided by the following questions and objectives.

1.3 Research Questions

1. How does Civilian Joint Task Force combat Boko Haram in Yobe State?
2. Why do people participate in the Civilian Joint Task Force in combating Boko Haram in Yobe State?
3. What are the challenges of Civilian Joint Task Force in combating Boko Haram in Yobe state?
4. Why does Yobe state government interest to incorporate the Civilian Joint Task Force as local security agents?

1.4 Research Objectives

The general objective of this thesis is to analyze the participation of Civilian Joint Task Force in combating Boko Haram in Yobe State Nigeria. The specific objectives entail the following:

1. To determine the strategy of Civilian Joint Task Force in combating Boko Haram group in Yobe State.
2. To examine the factors that motivates people to participate in the Civilian Joint Task Force for combating Boko Haram in Yobe State.
3. To identify the challenges of Civilian Joint Task Force in combating Boko Haram group in Yobe State.
4. To determine the factors that interest Yobe State government to incorporate Civilian Joint Task Force as local security agents.

1.5 Significance of the Study

This research is important and indeed timely. The study has both theoretical, policy and disciplinary implications. In the theoretical perspective, the study besides filling the widening gaps in the literature due to over-concentration of previous studies on the analysis of state-driven counterinsurgency, it will provide prudent empirical understanding on the peculiarities of the civilian self-defense group in combating violent armed groups within a sovereign state. In addition to the ongoing counterinsurgency operation in Nigeria, prevailing events suggest that pure conventional approach is less successful in many countries. This signifies the need for an alternate combating approach using the civilian measure. The analysis of the group will be significant for shedding light on a dimension of militia in counterinsurgency, for now, it appeared as a neglected area in security studies.

Moreover, nearly a decade since the eruption of the violent insurgency of the Boko Haram in Nigeria, the bulk of the counterinsurgency literature sought only to understand the classical combating strategy driven solemnly by the states through the instrumentality of conventional securities. There is inadequate study in respect to the counterinsurgency operation by civilian groups. This is particularly so in respect to the strategy of the CJTF group in Nigeria. In fact, the few available works analyzing the successes of the CJTF were conducted base on secondary data. In-depth

investigations on the strategy that yielded to the applauded successes were not exploits. This was also together with the motivations that incite the massive participation of people into the counterinsurgency campaign. This study thus aimed to explore the counterinsurgency strategy and the motivations of the participants to fill in the existing vacuum. The overall objective is to provide an empirical analysis of the CJTF participation in the counterinsurgency operation. To this end, the study is important for future academic references.

Beyond the contribution to the literature, the study is also important for contribution to the discipline of political science and precisely to the field of security studies. The mass body of the evolving literature focuses fundamentally on issues of terrorism, insurgency, and counterinsurgency. However, the literature on counterinsurgency operations through civilian combat is significantly inadequate. Western scholars majorly contributed the few existing works. The literature on civilian self-defense group from the perspective of developing countries is insignificant. Therefore, by providing empirical data about the strategy of CJTF in Nigeria; this study should have amicable disciplinary contributions. It will contribute significantly to the advancement of the discipline of Political Science and more specific to the field of Security Studies through the angle of developing countries. For future researchers, it will be a revelation to further researches thus enabling an in-depth understanding of alternate counterinsurgency approach of ending the insurgency in the world.

Concerning to the policy, this study will benefit policymakers in overcoming insurgent violence in their respective communities. The study will benefit Nigeria's government, the security actors and state governments in Nigeria's north for future security policy. Available evidence indicates that Nigeria's government over the years was engaged in serious security policy dilemma in the effort of combating the insurgent Boko Haram. The government was forced to constantly navigate around several but yet contradictory policies that have hindered the effectiveness of its counterinsurgency operation.

Additionally, Nigeria's government over the years, reportedly expending over 20% of its annual budget for procurement of heavy military hardware to combat the Boko Haram group. As indicated by Bappah (2016), since 2009, Nigeria's defense budget has increased tremendously. Between the years of 2001 and 2012, the total military budget was sum at US\$19 billion. In 2014, the Nigeria government defense accounted for nearly 20% of the national appropriation. Disturbingly, this massive military expenditure executed at the detriment of other compelling and stringent societal needs. This study through its empirical investigation of the combating strategy of CJTF, it will benefit the government with subsiding counterinsurgency measures that might be helpful for the government to end the decade-old insurgent violence. The study is also important for addressing the loopholes of conventional securities in combating activities. Empirical understanding of the circumstance that drives people to resort to self-defense during violent conflicts will further assist government policymakers with additional information of subverting, empowering or preventing current and future participation of civilians in the security arena of the country.

1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study

This study is conducted at Geidam of Yobe State in Nigeria's Northeast. Yobe State is one of the three (Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa) states worst affected by the Boko Haram in Nigeria. The state is also the birthplace of Mohammed Yusuf and Abubakar Shekau, the founder of the Boko Haram and present commander of the insurgent group respectively. Moreover, Yobe state was identified as the first state to witness the violent uprisings of the Boko Haram as early in the year 2003 (Onuoha, 2013). The present study covered a period of five years (2013-2018). This period covered the participation of the CJTF in combating the Boko Haram in northeast Nigeria

Moreover, Geidam is selected for this study because it is one of the worst affected local governments in Yobe state by insurgent Boko Haram group (Mohammed, 2014; Emuedo et al, 2015; Ali, Bubarain and Adamu, 2018; Perouse De Montclos, 2016; Pham, 2012). Therefore, Geidam appeared among the first local governments in Yobe state to experience the participation of people in the CJTF group. The restriction of the study to Geidam was due to the prevailing security challenges and partly due to resources and time constraints.

In fact, the selection of the CJTF group prompted by the woeful performances of the other groups that participated in combating activities since the eruption of the insurgency. In fact, some pieces of evidence show before the participation of the CJTF, Nigeria's government have deployed nearly 100,000 members of its armed securities under the Special Joint Task Force [SJTF] to combat the insurgency (Folade, 2016). However, in spite of the offensive measures by the SJTF, some sources indicated that the insurgents violently took control of sizeable land approximating to 30,000km² occupied by thousands of the population in Nigeria's north (Bappah, 2016; Folade, 2016). Most of these accounts claimed that the SJTF stepped up their operations against the insurgency, the more they continue loss control of villages and towns to the insurgent while losing caches of arms and munitions including heavy military artilleries to the insurgent.

Furthermore, the participation of 8700 troops of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF); a sub-regional military group established by the member countries of Lake Chad Basin Commission [Nigeria, Chad, Cameroun, Niger and Benin Republics] has not been successful in combating the insurgent group. As indicated Bappah (2016), besides the inability to combat the insurgency, the MNJTF disturbing loss its commands office in the ancient Baga town to the Boko Haram group leaving the helpless population to the heinous act of the Boko Haram. According to Obamamoye (2017), the ineffectiveness of the MNJTF recorded in spite of the commitment of a heavy sum of over \$300 million by donor agencies, and the Nigeria government to support the operation.

Besides the specialized military participation, the mobilization of Civil Society Group 'Bringbackourgirls' which was joined by many prominent global personalities and

world leaders, to mount pressure on the government to accelerate the rescue of the over 270 abducted school-girls by the Boko Haram in Chibok has not been successful. However, in spite of the continuously unimpressive performances of the government measures and civil society group, the participation of the CJTF resulted in remarkable successes (Bamidele, 2016; Chuckuma, 2017; Agbiboa, 2015a). The group in addition to assisting in degrading the insurgency violence by reducing both attack frequencies and fatalities rates in most of the communities they participated, CJTF is instrumental in abating attacks targeted on Nigeria's security operatives. The successes of the group in spite of the poor performance of highly trained; well-connected, full funded institutions thus made the CJTF a unique group requiring investigation. The voluntary participation of the CJTF group and the tremendous successes triggered the interest for investigating the CJTF group.

Therefore, the scope of this thesis is to provide an in-depth analysis of the participation of the CJTF group in the counterinsurgency operation in Nigeria. Specific areas of analysis involved the combating strategy of the CJTF; the motivations that triggered participation of people in the CJTF; the constraining challenges of the group, and the interest of government for incorporating the CJTF as a local security agent. The timeframe covered by the study is six years (2013-2018). The selection of this period was guided by the literature that shows the participation of CJTF in Nigeria's counterinsurgency was around the year 2013 (Agbiboa, 2014).

On the theoretical front, the scope of this thesis was restricted to counterinsurgency theory. Concerning to the limitation of the study, it is imperative to state that in addition to the Boko Haram insurgency, there are numerous security crises in Nigeria in several parts of the country, however, the findings of this study cannot be suitable in explaining other security crises other than the Boko Haram group and the CJTF participation.

Furthermore, this thesis has not involved informant from the military nor allied state security agency. Therefore, the empirical evidence about the failure of the military arrived base on the perceptions of the informants involved in the study, the researchers' observations during the fieldwork and existing literature using the theoretical framework underpinning the study. Perhaps, the inability of the researcher to collect data from the state security agencies partly attributed to many factors. One factor is that permission to state security agencies is difficult to access due to extensive bureaucratic policies. This was further constrained by the terrifying insurgency rebellion coinciding the time of conducting the research. In fact, due to the security situation, security agencies remain suspicious of the civil population therefore raised barrier for the researcher to accesses information in relation to their counterinsurgency operation. However, while the researcher was unable to collect data from the security agencies, extensive efforts taken to triangulate the data from the varying sources to reach the thesis conclusion.

1.7 Definitions of Concepts

In the following paragraphs, the definition of the main concepts and operational definition as used in this study will be present.

Participation

Participation according to Claridge (2004) is a range of processes through which local communities are involved and play an active role in issues that affects them. Michener (1998) defines participation as an act of social process whereby specific groups of people with shared needs living in a given geographical area actively engaged and pursues their needs, take decisions and establish mechanisms that facilitate the meeting these needs. In this thesis, participation referred to mobilization of an informal civilian defence group in the combating operation against an Islamist insurgent group Boko Haram in Nigeria's northeast.

Insurgency

United States Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual [FM 3-24] (2006) defined insurgency as an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control. Hoffman (2007) defined insurgency as violent competition between a state and a rival political group to control a population or establish an alternative political order.

In this thesis, an insurgency defined as politico-military and religious struggle by a group of people aim at establishing a distinct authority within a given political setting that will ensure the control of resources, people and physical area. Put differently, it is a deliberate politico-economic, social and religious movement by people aims at changing an existing political, economy and social order fought through the instrumentality of guerrilla.

Counterinsurgency

United States Army and Marine Field Manual (2006) defined counterinsurgency as military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency. Australian military officer and strategist David Kilcullen (2006), define counterinsurgency as a competition of state with an insurgent group over the right and ability to win the heart and minds of the people. Gray (2012) defined counterinsurgency as a set or combinations of diverse and multifaceted activities used in combating an insurgent violence in a given society.

In this thesis, counterinsurgency refers to all activities involving military, paramilitary, civilian, political and sociocultural actions taken by government, civilian groups and international groups for combating an insurgent group. It involved a total sum of

military, intelligence and democratic actions of waning the support of the population toward an insurgent activities.

Strategy

Today the concept of strategy is used loosely in different scholarships. However, in the context of combating project, Chinese Military Strategist Sun Tzu (1986) define strategy as a tactical plan of action that figure out how war is fought before the formal engagement in the battle. According to Sun Tzu, strategy spells the main activities and the schemes required in winning the battle. The expert notes that battles are wins in the mind long before engaging the enemy force. Moreover, Mintzberg (1987) defined strategy as a set of consciously intended course of action, guidelines and principles aim at dealing with a particular situation or problem. United States Army War College Guide (2008) also defined strategy as a concerted plan of campaign combining a system of military operations determined by the end to attain the character of the enemy, the resource endowment and the means to attack and defend.

In this thesis, a strategy is defined as an art of developing and applying political, psychological economic powers of combating insurgency to restore peace. In other words, it is refers to as an art of drafting war plan, shaping individual campaign as well as deciding on a tactical procedure of engagement in the counterinsurgency war. In this respect, it involves all activities, schemes, principle and guideline use by CJTF in combating an insurgent group Boko Haram.

Military Strategy

Military strategy according to Campbell & Weitz (2006) refers to all activities, principles, and tactics used by regular security group in waging war in a given political setting. In most respect, the military strategy according to Pechenkina and Bennett (2017) relies on “stick” operations that involve the use of aggression such as detention of suspect, brutal elimination of individual insurgents, disruption of insurgent support networks, and decapitation of insurgent organizations. It is a kinetic component of the counterinsurgency response to guerrilla warfare.

In this thesis, Military strategy refer to all forms of conventional combat adopted by armed force and other paramilitary forces in combating an insurgency in a given political entity. The main principle of the military counterinsurgency strategy is the application of aggressive military force involving violent destruction of the enemy force and threatening of local population to forcedly withdraw support for the insurgent.

Non-military Strategy

Non-military strategy according to Campbell & Weitz (2006) refers to all political, social, cultural and psychological measures taken by government, groups or individual

in combating an insurgent group without the use of force. Non-military strategy in this thesis refers to all forms of combating tactics taken by state and non-state actors in maintaining security that does not involve the use of force.

Although, the non-military strategy in the present study does not necessarily entail direct government security engagement, however, the non-military approach of the CJTF may still carry out a military if it is overtly deployed, or in collaboration with the armed regular securities. However, the fundamental principle guiding the operation can be persuasion of the local population to obstruct the support network of the insurgent among the host population.

Motivation

Motivation according to Ryan and Deci (2000) is an internal stimulus that drives the individual to action. The authors classified motivation into intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation is the act of doing something because of the inherent reward and satisfaction. Extrinsic motivation, on the other hand, is doing an activity because of its joy rather than other factors or value. Motivation in this study refers to a combination of both intrinsic and extrinsic factors that trigger peoples' participation in the CJTF group. It refers to financial, material and psychological factors that triggers participation of people in the counterinsurgency operation against the insurgent group Boko Haram.

1.8 Conceptual Framework

Conceptual framework refers to the processes of an organization of major concepts that formed up a study. Jabareen (2009) pointed conceptual framework is a network of interlinked concepts that enable a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon under study. In this regard, the conceptual framework of this study explains the combating strategy of the Civilian Joint Task Force that led to its successful combating activity as shown in figure 1.1 below.




Figure 1.1 : Conceptual Framework of the Study

As illustrated in figure 1.1, the Nigeria government engaged in the combating activities of the Boko Haram through a combination of military and political-legal measures. The military approach involved the deployment of a military task force code-named Special Joint Task Force (SJTF) comprising of the members of the Nigeria armed force; the police; custom, immigration and other allied security forces. The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF); a collaboration troops donated by member countries of Lake Chad Basin Commission (Nigeria, Chad, Cameroun, Benin, and Niger Republics) hunting the Boko Haram fighters in cross-border pursuit along the Lake Chad Basin also supports SJTF. To supplement the military combat, the Nigeria government adopted several politico-legal measures such as the declaration of State emergency (martial law) in the three most affected states by the insurgency (Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa). Others are the enactment of counterterrorism laws by Nigeria’s parliament to provide corporal punishment for the insurgent fighters and collaborators.

However, as indicated by the small broken arrow in figure 1.1, the measures taken by the government appeared ineffective in combating the Boko Haram group. Therefore, arising from the ineffectiveness of the Nigeria government and the MNJTF by the Lake Chad Basin Countries, the local population in the Nigeria northeast participated in a civilian self-defense force ‘Civilian Joint Task Force’ (CJTF) to volunteer in combating the Boko Haram fighters. In its combating operation, the CJTF since its participation has been collaborating the SJTF and MNJTF and has been incorporated by the government hence receiving financial and material support. Whereas the military is providing arms and other logistics support as illustrated by the big broken arrows at the right in figure 1.1.

Observably, figure 1.1 illustrated that the combating strategy of the CJTF is seemingly successful. The strategy of the group succeeded to degrade the insurgent forcing some fighters to flee away from the population, some killed and others arrested. Moreover, the relentless operation of the CJTF forces some of the Boko Haram fighters to defect back to the population and others joined the CJTF group as illustrated by the non-broken arrows. Nevertheless, the figure further illustrated that even as the strategy of the CJTF is successful, however, there are numerous challenges hindering the combating operation of operation of the group.

1.9 Organization of Chapters

This research is divided into five chapters. Chapter one consists of the general background of the study, the statement of the research problem, research questions, objectives of the study, significance of the study, scope and limitations, operational definitions of key concepts and the organization of chapters. The second chapter is a review of the literature and discussion of the theoretical framework of the study. The third chapter explained the methodology of the study. The chapter discusses the methods of data collection and the design of the study. The chapter also contained the explanations of the methods and criteria used in the analysis of data as well as discussions on issues on validity and ethical factors observed in the research. The fourth chapter is the analysis and discussions of the research findings, whereas the fifth chapter is the summary, conclusion, recommendations, and implications of the study as well as the limitations and suggestion for further studies.

1.10 Summary of Chapter

This chapter presented the main background of this study. It highlighted the problem that supposedly triggered this investigation. The chapter also contained the objectives of the study along with the significance of the thesis. It explained the scopes and limitation of the study together with a conceptual and operational definition of key term/concepts as used in the study. It presented the conceptual framework of study and finally closed by an explanation of the organizations of the research work.

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- Gana, M.L., Samsu, K.H & Ismail, M.M. (2018). Counterinsurgency Responses in Nigeria: Unveiling the Constraining Challenges, *International Journal of Arts Humanities and Social Sciences*, Vol. 3(6):1-8
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- Gana, M.L., Samsu, K.H & Ismail, M.M (2019). Galula Counterinsurgency Approach: The Pathway for Successful Counterinsurgency in Nigeria, Submitted to *Social Science Research*, 2019

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