UNIVERSITI PUTRA MALAYSIA

AN INTEGRATED ANOMALY INTRUSION DETECTION SCHEME USING
STATISTICAL, HYBRIDIZED CLASSIFIERS AND SIGNATURE APPROACH

WARUSIA MOHAMED YASSIN

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By
WARUSIA MOHAMED YASSIN

Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies, Universiti Putra Malaysia, in
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DEDICATIONS

To My Family and Friends
Abstract of thesis presented to the Senate of Universiti Putra Malaysia in fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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WARUSIA MOHAMED YASSIN

April 2015

Chairman: Nur Izura Udzir, Ph.D.
Faculty: Computer Science and Information Technology

Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) effectively balance additional security in a computer system by identifying intrusive activities on a computer system, and their enhancements are developing at a surprising rate. Detection methods based on statistical and data mining techniques are widely deployed as anomaly-based detection system (ADS). Although the statistical-based anomaly detection (SAD) method fascinates researchers, the low attack detection rates (also known as the detection of true positive) that reflect the effectiveness of the detection system generally persist. Specifically, this is due to the packets affected by the outlier data points (i.e., the data points that have a huge dissimilarity with the common data points) and the defined threshold size that is usually performed without any further analysis on the observed packet. It provides a significant effect in the process to determine which packet is more likely attributes to the anomalous behaviour. In recent years, data mining based anomaly detection (DMAD), particularly classification methods, have been incessantly enhanced in differentiating normal and attack behaviour. Unfortunately, in such methods the outcomes, i.e., true positive, true negative, false positive and false negative detections that directly influence the rates of accuracy, detection, and false alarms are not much improved and thus raise a persistent problem in the employment of such systems. The specific drawback that causes this is the failure to differentiate the packets behaviour that resembles a similar behaviour more precisely, such as a normal behaviour having a similar anomalous content behaviour and vice versa. These inaccurate outcomes can compromise the reliability of IDSs and cause them to overlook the attacks. As ADS can process massive volumes of packets, the amount of processing time needed to discover the pattern of the packets is also increased accordingly and resulting in late detection of the attack packets. The main contributor for such a shortcoming is the need to re-compute every process for each packet despite the attack behaviour having been examined.

This study aims to improve the detection of an anomalous behaviour by identifying the outlier data points in the packets more precisely, maximizes the detection of packets with similar behaviours more accurately while reducing the detection time. An Integrated Anomaly Detection Scheme (IADS) is proposed to overcome the aforesaid
drawbacks. The proposed scheme integrates an ADS and signature-based detection system (SDS) approach for better and rapid intrusion detection. Therefore, Statistical-based Packet Header Anomaly Detection (SPHAD) and a hybridized Naive Bayes and Random Forest classifier (NB+RF) are considered for the ADS, and Signature-based Packet Header Intrusion Detection (SPHID) is proposed as the SDS. In SPHAD, statistical analysis is used to construct a normal profile using statistical formula, scoring the incoming packets, and computing the relationships between historic normal behaviour as a dependent variable against observable packet behaviours as the independent variable through linear regression. Then the threshold measurement (size) is defined based on $R^2$ and Cohen’s-$d$ values in order to improve the attack detection rate by identifying a set of outlier data points which are present inside the packets more precisely. Subsequently, NB+RF, a hybrid classification algorithm is used to distinguish similar and dissimilar content behaviours of a packet. The Naive Bayes (NB) classifier is employed to construct the values of the posterior and the prior probability of a packet, then this information as well as the header values and statistical analysis information are fed to the Random Forest (RF) classifier to improve the detection of actual attacks and normal packets. SPHID then extracts the distinct behaviour of the packets which are verified as attacks by NB+RF and compute it as attack signatures for faster future detections, as the detection time will be reduced for the attack whose signature is already included in the signature database.

The effectiveness of the IADS has been evaluated under different detection capabilities (i.e., false positive, false negative, true positive, true negative, false alarm, accuracy, detection rate, attack data detection rate, normal data detection rate) and detection times using the DARPA 1999 and ISCX 2012 intrusion detection benchmark datasets as well as with Live-data. Results from the experiments demonstrate that IADS could effectively detect attacks and normal packets more precisely compared to previous work and the ADS which performs intrusion detections without employing the SPHID method. In addition, the detection time of IADS is much improved as compared to ADS. Thus, IADS is a better solution for anomaly detection methods in detecting untrustworthy behaviour and to define attack and normal behaviours more accurately.
Abstrak tesis yang dikemukakan kepada Senat Universiti Putra Malaysia sebagai memenuhi keperluan untuk Ijazah Doktor Falsafah

SKIM PENGESANAN PENCEROBOHAN ANOMALI BERSEPADU MENGGUNAKAN KAEDAH STATISTIK, PENGELAS HIBRID DAN PENDEKATAN TANDA KENAL

Oleh

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Sistem pengesanan pencerobohan (IDS) memperseimbangkan alat tambahan keselamatan secara efektif dengan mengenal pasti aktiviti pencerobohan pada sistem komputer, dan penambahbaikan alat ini kerap berlaku pada kadar yang tidak dijangka. Kaedah-kaedah sistem pengesanan pencerobohan berasaskan anomali (ADS), yang menggunakan algoritma perlombongan data mampu mengenal pasti serangan-serangan yang tidak dikenali. Walauapun kaedah pengesanan anomali berasaskan statistik (SAD) memikat penyelidik, kadar pengesanan pencerobohan yang rendah yang juga dikenali sebagai pengesanan benar positif, mencerminkan keberkesanan sistem pengesanan umumnya berterusan. Khususnya, ia disebabkan oleh paket yang terjejas akibat titik-titik terpencil iaitu titik data yang mempunyai perbezaan besar dengan titik data biasa, dan saiz ambang yang biasanya ditakrifkan tanpa melakukan apa-apa analisa lanjutan terhadap paket yang diperhatikan. Ia memberi kesan yang ketara dalam proses untuk menentukan paket mana yang lebih cenderung kepada sifat-sifat tingkah laku yang beranomali. Sejak kebelakangan ini, pengesanan anomali berasaskan perlombongan data (DMAD), khususnya kaedah klasiifikasi di tambah baik secara berterusan dalam membezakan tingkah laku normal dan pencerobohan. Malangnya, menerusi penggunaan kaedah ini, hasil output iaitu pengesanan packet normal dan pencerobohan yang secara langsung mempengaruhi kadar ketepatan, kadar pengesanan dan kadar ‘false alarm’ tidak diperbaiki ke tahap yang lebih baik serta menimbulkan masalah dalam penggunaan sistem pengesanan anomali secara berterusan. Kelemahan khusus yang menyebabkan keadaan ini adalah akibat daripada kegagalan untuk membezakan tingkah laku kandungan paket yang menyerupai tingkah laku yang lain dengan lebih tepat, kontohnya tingkah laku paket normal yang menyerupai tingkah laku paket beranomali dan sebaliknya. Hasil yang tidak tepat boleh menjadikan kebolehpercayaaan IDSs dan menyebabkan mereka terlepas pandang packet pencerobohan. Memandangkan ADS mampu memproses jumlah packets yang besar, jumlah masa pemprosesan yang diperlukan untuk menemui bentuk paket turut meningkat dan menyebabkan kelewatan dalam pengesanakan paket pencerobohan. Penyumbang utama untuk kekurangan ini ialah keperluan untuk mengira semula setiap proses bagi setiap packet walaupun tingkah laku pencerobohan yang terlibat sudah diperiksa sebelum ini. Kajian ini bertujuan untuk membaiki mahupun meningkatkan pengesanan tingkah laku
beranomali dengan mengenalpasti titik-titik data terpencil di dalam paket dan memaksimumkan pengesanan paket yang mempunyai tigkah laku yang sama dengan lebih tepat disamping mengurangkan masa pengesanan. Satu skim pengesanan anomali bersepadu (IADS) dicadangkan untuk mengatasi kelemahan-kelemahan di atas. Skim yang dicadangkan menyepadukan ADS dan pendekatan sistem pengesanan tanda kenal (SDS) untuk pengesanan pencerobohan yang lebih baik dan cepat. Oleh itu, pengesanan anomali pengepala paket berasaskan kaedah statistik (SPHAD) dan pengelas hibrid Naive Bayes dan Random Forest (NB+RF) yang dicadangkan dipertimbangkan sebagai sistem ADS, dan pengesanan intrusi pengepala paket berasaskan tanda kenal (SPHID) sebagai SDS. Analisa statistik digunakan untuk membina profil normal menerusi formula statistik, memberi skor kepada setiap paket yang masuk dan mengira perhubungan antara tingkah laku paket normal sejarah yang digunakan sebagai pembolehubah bersandar terhadap tingkah laku paket baharu yang boleh dicerap sebagai pembolehubah bebas melalui regresi linear di dalam SPHAD. Kemudian ukuran (saiz) ambang ditakrif berdasarkan nilai-nilai $R^2$ dan Cohen’s-$d$ untuk meningkatkan mahupun membaiki kadar pengesanan pencerobohan dengan mengenalpasti titik-titik data terpencil yang berada di dalam paket dengan lebih tepat. Selepas itu, NB+RF, algoritma pengelas hibrid digunakan untuk membezakan tingkah laku kandungan paket yang sama dan yang berbeza. Pengelas Naive Bayes (NB) digunakan untuk membina nilai-nilai kebarangkalian ’prior’ dan ’posterior’ sesuatu paket terlebih dahulu, kemudian nilai-nilai tersebut, kandungan nilai pengepala paket serta maklumat berkemana analisa statistik disalurkan kepada pengelas Random Forest (RF) untuk meningkatkan mahupun membaiki pengesanan paket pencerobohan dan normal yang sebenar. SPHID mengekstrak tingkah laku paket yang unik yang ditentusahkan sebagai pencerobohan oleh NB+RF dan mengiranya sebagai tanda kenal pencerobohan untuk mengesankan pencerobohan dengan lebih cepat pada masa akan datang, dimana masa pengesanan dapat dikurangkan sekiranya tanda kenal bagi sesuatu pencerobohan didapati wujud di dalam pangkalan data tanda kenal.

Keberkesanan IADS telah dinilai di bawah keupayaan pengesanan yang berbeza iaitu positif palsu, negatif palsu, positif benar, negatif benar,kadar ’false alarm’, kadar ketepatan, kadar pengesanan, kadar pengesanan data pencerobohan dan kadar pengesanan data normal serta tempoh masa pengesanan menggunakan data-data penanda aras pengesanan pencerobohan seperti DARPA 1999, ISCX 2012 serta data hidup. Keputusan eksperimen menunjukkan bahawa IADS dapat mengesankan paket-paket pencerobohan dan normal dengan lebih tepat berbanding dengan kajian sebelum ini serta ADS, yang merupakan skim yang melakukan pengesanan pencerobohan tanpa menggunakan kaedah SPHID. Tambahan pula, pengesanan masa IADS adalah baik berbanding dengan kaedah ADS. Oleh itu, IADS merupakan satu penyelesaian yang lebih memuaskan untuk kaedah ADS dalam mengesankan tingkah laku yang tidak dipercayai dan mendefinisi paket pencerobohan dan normal dengan lebih tepat.
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I certify that a Thesis Examination Committee has met on 30 April 2015 to conduct the final examination of S.M.Warusia Mohamed Bin S.M.M Yassin on his thesis entitled "An Integrated Anomaly Intrusion Detection Scheme Using Statistical, Hybridized Classifiers and Signature Approach" in accordance with the Universities and University Colleges Act 1971 and the Constitution of the Universiti Putra Malaysia [P.U.(A) 106] 15 March 1998. The Committee recommends that the student be awarded the Doctor of Philosophy.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRAK</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPROVAL</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECLARATION</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>xiii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>xiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>xviii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1  INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Background</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Motivation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Problem Statement</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Research Questions</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 Objectives of Research</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6 Scope of Research</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7 Research Contributions</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.8 Organization of Thesis</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2  LITERATURE REVIEW</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Intrusion Detection System</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Statistical based Anomaly Detection</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Data Mining based Anomaly Detection</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.1 Classification Methods</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.2 Hybridized Classifiers</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Related Work</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.1 Packet based Anomaly Detection</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.2 Hybridized Classification Methods</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 Summary</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Requirement Analysis</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Designing the Proposed Detection Scheme</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.1 Normal Profile</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.2 Binary Stream</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.3 Linear Regression Analysis</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.4 Cohen’s-d</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.5 Threshold</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.6 Naive Bayes and Random Forest</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.7 Signature Matching</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.8 Detection File</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.2.9 Signature Formation 29  
3.2.10 Signature File 29  
3.3 Implementation of the Proposed Detection Scheme 29  
3.4 Evaluation of the Proposed Detection Scheme 30  
3.4.1 Experimental Design 30  
3.4.2 Experimental Setup 33  
3.4.3 Analyses 38  
3.4.4 Evaluation Measurement 38  
3.5 Summary 39  

4 INTEGRATED ANOMALY BASED DETECTION SCHEME 40  
4.1 Previous Study Anomaly Based Detection Model 40  
4.2 Integrated Anomaly Based Detection Scheme Processes 42  
4.3 Normal Profile 47  
4.4 Linear Regression, Cohen’s-d and Threshold 50  
4.5 Hybridized Naïve Bayes and Random Forest Algorithm 52  
4.6 Attack Signature Creation 54  
4.7 Summary 57  

5 IMPLEMENTATION OF IADS 59  
5.1 Standard Profile Creation Procedure 59  
5.2 Matching and Scoring Procedure 60  
5.3 Linear Regression Analysis 62  
5.4 Naïve Bayes and Random Forest Classification Procedure 67  
5.5 Signature Creation Procedure 71  
5.6 Summary 72  

6 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 73  
6.1 Preliminary Experiments 73  
6.2 Evaluation Process of IADS 83  
6.3 Evaluation through DARPA 1999 Dataset 84  
6.3.1 Statistical-based Packet Header Anomaly Detection (SPHAD) 84  
6.3.2 Hybridized Classifier (NB+RF) 89  
6.3.3 IADS and ADS Performance Comparison Using DARPA 1999 Dataset 94  
6.4 Evaluation through ISCX 2012 Dataset 97  
6.4.1 Statistical-based Packet Header Anomaly Detection (SPHAD) 98  
6.4.2 Hybridized Classifiers NB+RF 99  
6.4.3 IADS and ADS Performance Comparison Using ISCX 2012 Dataset 105  
6.5 Evaluation through Live-Data 108  
6.5.1 Statistical-based Packet Header Anomaly Detection (SPHAD) 108  
6.5.2 Hybridized Classifier NB+RF 110  
6.5.3 IADS and ADS Performance Comparison  

xi
Using Live-data 115
6.6 Summary of Overall Performance 118
6.7 Summary 119

7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 120
7.1 Conclusion 120
7.2 Contributions of the Work 121
7.3 Future Work 122

REFERENCES 123
APPENDIX 130
BIODATA OF STUDENT 131
LIST OF PUBLICATIONS 132
LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Comparison of Related Work (Statistical Methods)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Comparison of Related Work (Hybridized Methods)</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Training Data (Week 4) and Testing Data (Week 5) Distribution of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DARPA 1999 Dataset (Machine 172.016.112.050)</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Training Data and Testing Data Distribution of ISCX 2012 Dataset</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Training Data and Testing Data Distribution of Live-data</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 Type of Attacks of Live-data</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Normal Profile</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Example of Packet (n) Scores Computation Using DARPA 1999</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Statistic of Reported Incidents, 2014</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Number of Reported Incidents, 2000-2014</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Research Process</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Components of IADS</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Experimental and Analyses Process</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>Live-data Network Architecture</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Previous Study Anomaly Detection Model</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Detection Process of Anomaly Detection System (ADS)</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>The Proposed Integrated Anomaly Detection Scheme (IADS)</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>Loosely Coupled</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Tightly Coupled</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>Example of Matched Signature with Incoming Packet 1</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>Example of Matched Incoming Packet 1 with Signature</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>Example of Signature which Do Not Match with Incoming Packet 2</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>Example of Incoming Packet 2 which Do Not Match with Signature</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>The IADS Implementation Procedure Flow</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Detection Time for Single Classifier Using DARPA 1999 (Week 5)</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Accuracy for Single Classifier Using DARPA 1999 (Week 5)</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>Detection Rate for Single Classifier Using DARPA 1999 (Week 5)</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>False Alarm for Single Classifier Using DARPA 1999 (Week 5)</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>Detection Time for Hybridized Classifier Using DARPA 1999</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>Accuracy for Hybridized Classifier Using DARPA 1999 (Week 5)</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>Detection Rate for Hybridized Classifier Using DARPA 1999</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>False Alarm for Hybridized Classifier Using DARPA 1999 (Week 5)</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>Detection Time for Single Classifier Using ISCX 2012</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>Accuracy for Single Classifier Using ISCX 2012</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>Detection Rate for Single Classifier Using ISCX 2012</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.12</td>
<td>False Alarm for Single Classifier Using ISCX 2012</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.13</td>
<td>Detection Time for Hybridized Classifier Using ISCX 2012</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.14</td>
<td>Accuracy for Hybridized Classifier Using ISCX 2012</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.15 Detection Rate for Hybridized Classifier Using ISCX 2012
6.16 False Alarm for Hybridized Classifier Using ISCX 2012
6.17 Detection Time for Single Classifier Using Live-Data
6.18 Accuracy for Single Classifier Using Live-Data
6.19 Detection Rate for Single Classifier Using Live-Data
6.20 False Alarm for Single Classifier Using Live-Data
6.21 Detection Time for Hybridized Classifier Using Live-Data
6.22 Accuracy for Hybridized Classifier Using Live-Data
6.23 Detection Rate for Hybridized Classifier Using Live-Data
6.24 False Alarm for Hybridized Classifier Using Live-Data
6.25 Poorly Detected NIDS (SPHAD VS. PHAD)
6.26 Poorly Detected HIDS (SPHAD VS. PbPHAD VS. Best System)
6.27 True Positive Detection for DARPA 1999 of Training Dataset
6.28 True Negative Detection for DARPA 1999 of Training Dataset
6.29 False Positive Detection for DARPA 1999 of Training Dataset
6.30 False Negative Detection for DARPA 1999 of Training Dataset
6.31 False Alarm Rate for DARPA 1999 of Training Dataset
6.32 Attack Detection Rate for DARPA 1999 of Training Dataset
6.33 Normal Detection Rate for DARPA 1999 of Training Dataset
6.34 True Positive Detection for DARPA 1999 of Testing Dataset
6.35 True Negative Detection for DARPA 1999 of Testing Dataset
6.36 False Positive Detection for DARPA 1999 of Testing Dataset
6.37 False Negative Detection for DARPA 1999 of Testing Dataset
6.38 False Alarm Rate for DARPA 1999 of Testing Dataset
6.39 Attack Detection Rate for DARPA 1999 of Testing Dataset
6.40 Normal Detection Rate for DARPA 1999 of Testing Dataset
6.41 False Alarm of IADS and ADS of DARPA 1999 Dataset
6.42 Detection Time of IADS and ADS for DARPA 1999 Dataset
6.43 Average Packets Processed of IADS and ADS for DARPA 1999 Dataset
6.44 Distribution of Unknown and Known Attack Signature for DARPA 1999 Dataset
6.45 Detection Performance of SPHAD Using Training Set of ISCX 2012
6.47 True Positive Detection of ISCX 2012 Training Dataset 100
6.48 True Negative Detection of ISCX 2012 Training Dataset 100
6.49 False Positive Detection of ISCX 2012 Training Dataset 100
6.50 False Negative Detection of ISCX 2012 Training Dataset 101
6.51 False Alarm Rate of ISCX 2012 Training Dataset 101
6.52 Attack Detection Rate of ISCX 2012 Training Dataset 101
6.53 Normal Detection Rate of ISCX 2012 Training Dataset 102
6.54 True Positive of ISCX 2012 Testing Dataset 103
6.55 True Negative of ISCX 2012 Testing Dataset 103
6.56 False Positive of ISCX 2012 Testing Dataset 103
6.57 False Negative of ISCX 2012 Testing Dataset 104
6.58 False Alarm Rate of ISCX 2012 Testing Dataset 104
6.59 Attack Detection Rate of ISCX 2012 Testing Dataset 104
6.60 Normal Detection Rate of ISCX 2012 Testing Dataset 105
6.61 False Alarm of IADS and ADS of ISCX 2012 Dataset 106
6.62 Detection Time Consuming for IADS and ADS of ISCX Dataset 106
6.63 Average Packets Processed for IADS and ADS of ISCX Dataset 107
6.64 Distribution of Unknown and Known Attack Signature for ISCX Dataset 107
6.65 Detection Performance of SPHAD Using Training Set of Live-data 109
6.67 True Positive of Live-data Training Dataset 110
6.68 True Negative of Live-data Training Dataset 111
6.69 False Positive of Live-data Training Dataset 111
6.70 False Negative of Live-data Training Dataset 111
6.71 False Alarm Rate of Live-data Training Dataset 112
6.72 Attack Detection Rate of Live-data Training Dataset 112
6.73 Normal Detection Rate of Live-data Training Dataset 112
6.74 True Positive of Live-data Testing Dataset 113
6.75 True Negative of Live-data Testing Dataset 113
6.76 False Positive of Live-data Testing Dataset 113
6.77 False Negative of Live-data Testing Dataset 114
6.78 False Alarm Rate of Live-data Testing Dataset 114
6.79 Attack Detection Rate of Live-data Testing Dataset 114
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.80</td>
<td>Normal Detection Rate of Live-data Testing Dataset</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.81</td>
<td>False Alarm of IADS and ADS of Live-data Testing Dataset</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.82</td>
<td>Detection Time Consuming for IADS and ADS of Live-data Testing Dataset</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.83</td>
<td>Average Packets Processed for IADS and ADS of Live-data Testing Dataset</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.84</td>
<td>Distribution of Unknown and Known Attack Signature for Live-data Testing Dataset</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Accuracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-DR</td>
<td>Attack Detection Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM</td>
<td>Anomaly Detection Model</td>
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<td>ADS</td>
<td>Anomaly-based Detection System</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALAD</td>
<td>Application Layer Anomaly Detector</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANN</td>
<td>Artificial Neural Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Confidentiality, Integrity and Assurance</td>
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<tr>
<td>DARPA</td>
<td>Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>DBMS</td>
<td>Database Management System</td>
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<tr>
<td>DM</td>
<td>Data Mining</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMAD</td>
<td>Data Mining-based Anomaly Detection</td>
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<tr>
<td>DR</td>
<td>Detection Rate</td>
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<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>Dynamic Score</td>
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<tr>
<td>DST</td>
<td>Dempster Shafer Theory</td>
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<tr>
<td>DT</td>
<td>Decision Tree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA</td>
<td>False Alarm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>False Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>False Positive</td>
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<tr>
<td>NB+RF</td>
<td>Hybridized Naïve Bayes and Random Forest Classifier</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIDS</td>
<td>Host-based Intrusion Detection Systems</td>
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<td>HMM</td>
<td>Hidden Markov Models</td>
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<tr>
<td>IADS</td>
<td>Integrated Anomaly Detection Scheme</td>
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<td>IDES</td>
<td>Intrusion Detection Expert System</td>
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<td>IDS</td>
<td>Intrusion Detection System</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISCX</td>
<td>Information Security Center of Excellence</td>
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<td>LNID</td>
<td>Lightweight Network Intrusion Detection System</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Linear Regression Analysis</td>
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<td>LVQ</td>
<td>Learning Vector Quantization</td>
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<td>MCS</td>
<td>Multiple Classifier Systems</td>
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<td>MIT-LL</td>
<td>MIT Lincoln Labs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLP</td>
<td>Multi-Layer Perceptron</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRRROC</td>
<td>Maximum Realizable Receiver Operating Characteristics</td>
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<tr>
<td>MyCERT</td>
<td>Malaysia Computer Emergency Response Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>NB</td>
<td>Naïve Bayes</td>
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<tr>
<td>N-DR</td>
<td>Normal Detection Rate</td>
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<tr>
<td>NETAD</td>
<td>Network Traffic Anomaly Detector</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIDS</td>
<td>Network-based Intrusion Detection Systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>NN</td>
<td>Neural Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAID</td>
<td>Packet Analysis for Intrusion Detection</td>
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<tr>
<td>PbPHAD</td>
<td>Protocol Based Packet Header Anomaly Detection</td>
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<td>PHAD</td>
<td>Packet Header Anomaly Detector</td>
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<td>PS</td>
<td>Packet Score</td>
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<td>RF</td>
<td>Random Forest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROC</td>
<td>Receiver Operating Characteristics</td>
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<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>Resilient Back Propagation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Statistical Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAD</td>
<td>Statistical-based Anomaly Detection</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCG</td>
<td>Scaled Conjugate Gradient</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>Signature-based Detection System</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPHID</td>
<td>Signature-based Packet Header Intrusion Detection</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPHAD</td>
<td>Statistical-based Packet Header Anomaly Detection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>Static Score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVM</td>
<td>Support Vector Machine</td>
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<tr>
<td>TN</td>
<td>True Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP</td>
<td>True Positive</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Protecting an organization’s assets against threats from the network has become a major challenge in the wake of increasing network-based attacks. In addition, the confidential assets and vulnerabilities of computer and network systems could be exposed to cyber attacks if not well protected with security defenders. Cyber attacks are invasive tactics or operations used by unethical parties either from corporations or individuals against vulnerable systems (i.e., computer systems, computer networks, computer infrastructures, and computer information) in an attempt to modify, steal and/or destroy them (Kuang, 2007). Denial-of-service, Web site defacement, password sniffing, web browser exploits, and breach of access are examples of the consequences which could result from cyber attacks. In addition, these attacks have become more sophisticated and harmful as the Stuxnet (Karnouskos, 2011; Vida et al., 2014) worm recently showed.

Consequently, it is extremely important to develop mechanisms for intrusion detection in view of the conviction that suspicious activities can be detectable by taking measures to avoid their further breeding against computer networks or systems. Intrusion detection is the process of monitoring the activities taking place in a computer or network system and scrutinizing them for indications of potential intrusions and in determining suspicious activities there. Thus, intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are formed to detect cyber attack activities attempting to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) of interconnected computing systems (Zhou, 2005). Nowadays, IDS are the most extensively applied and significant components in computer security.

1.2 Motivation

Electronic transactions, online banking, hosting portals, etc., have raised Internet usage dramatically and cover almost the entire globe. Unfortunately, these trends also fuel hacking activities and dangerous cyber attacks that are able to breach even the strongest firewalls. Data from the Malaysia Computer Emergency Response Team (MyCERT)\(^1\) show a significant growth in cyber attacks in 2014 (Figure 1.1). Total cyber incidents from 2000 to 2014 are presented in Figure 1.2.

Cyber attacks have become an novel weapon of war around the world and their persistent growth against computer and network systems makes it critical to integrate more accurate IDS capable of maximizing correctly detectable data (i.e., true positives and negatives) and minimizing falsely detectable data (false positives and negatives) as

\(^1\) http://www.mycert.org.my
Figure 1.1: Statistic of Reported Incidents, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Spam</th>
<th>Malicious Codes</th>
<th>Intrusion Attempt</th>
<th>Intrusion</th>
<th>Denial of Service</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mac</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>47</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sept</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>105</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Dis</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1.2: Number of Reported Incidents, 2000-2014
as well as reducing the detection time to enable prompt identification of attacks.

Anomaly-based detection systems (ADS) which employ statistical analysis and data mining, particularly classification methods is a significant field to be explored for attaining the above mentioned capabilities. The necessity for continuous enhancement of intrusion detection capabilities, detection time, and its numerous approaches is the motivation for this research.

1.3 Problem Statement

Creating an anomaly-based detection system (ADS) model using statistical analysis and data mining approaches is demanding in a field of IDSs. Although various improved methods have been developed and introduced every year in statistical-based anomaly detection, the problem to identify the correct attack packet is still not satisfactory. Moreover, many such detection methods have a low attack detection rate (also referred as the detection rate of true positives) is an essential key indicator used to assess a statistical-based anomaly detection method. It is due to the use of anomaly scores in defining threshold measurement in identifying attack packet, which is affected from outlier data points (the data points that have a huge dissimilarity with the common data points called outlier data points) and the threshold size that usually defined without performing any further analysis on the observed packet. It gives a great impression in the process to determine the packet which is more likely to be anomalous. For example, such situation will get worse if there is more than one outlier data points in every single packet headers. Generally, this detection method generates maximum false alarms (false positives) due to the difficulty in accurately separating normal packet that is not visibly different from attack packet. Consequently, data mining approaches, particularly classification methods, are receiving growing interest within intrusion detection societies as they have proficiency for reducing false positives. The common challenge associated with classification methods is the performance of these detection systems in terms of detection rates, accuracy, and false alarm. However, the specific problem that causes this is a failure to differentiate the packets behaviour that resembles a similar behaviour more precisely. For example, an anomalous behaviour contains similar normal behaviours as the real normal packets and normal packet behaviours have similar anomalous content behaviours. This is the reason why the existing classification methods are less efficient in classifying attack and normal packet that contributes to false detections (false negatives and false positives) as well as fewer correct detections (true negatives and true positives). Thus, these inaccurate outcomes compromise the reliability of IDSs and cause them to overlook the attacks. Apart from detection capabilities, the detection time involved in using ADS methods are time consuming, resulting in delays in detecting whether a packet pattern is an attack or normal. For example, using these detection method procedures, each involved process need to be re-computed for each piece of packet despite the attack behaviour having been examined. In addition, time consuming issues can become worse if the packets relatively high.
Specifically, this thesis addresses the following issues:

1. A number of efforts offer statistical-based anomaly detections using packet header to identify abnormal behaviour such as Chen et al. (2010), Lee et al. (2008), Mahoney (2003), Mahoney and Chan (2001, 2002), Shamsuddin and Woodward, (2008), and Xiong et al. (2013). The major drawback of those detection methods is defining the threshold measurement in identifying the attack packets which is affected from outlier data points without performing any further analysis on the observed packets. Consequently, this statistical-based anomaly detection method is inadequate for identifying an attack packet more accurately and results in low attack detection rates (true positives).

2. Classification methods have been introduced and widely employed by various researchers in the field of ADS with the aim to reduce false detection rates as well as increase correct detection rates. Unfortunately, existing classification methods are less efficient in classifying an attack and normal packet and contribute to increases in false negatives and false positives with lower rates of true negatives and true positives. The major reason causes those limitations have been a failure to differentiate the packets behaviour that resembles a similar behaviour more precisely. There have been a number of earlier researches performing intrusion detection using the classification approach and these had more than 1% false positive or false alarm rates. These include Decision Tree (Kosamkar et al., 2014), Support Vector Machine (Kosamkar et al., 2014), and Naive Bayes (Sagale et al., 2014) with 9.79%, 4.94%, and 1.48% as false positive rates, respectively.

3. In most regular practices the ADS method only focuses on improving the detection performance by overlooking its capability in terms of detection time. Thus, the detection time for an intrusion detection process using ADS method is time consuming. An example of previous work are Tribak et al., (2012).

1.4 Research Questions

This thesis proposes an Integrated Anomaly Detection Scheme (IADS) based on a number of integrated methods, namely, statistical-based packet header anomaly detection (SPHAD), hybridized classifiers (NB+RF), and signature-based packet header intrusion detection (SPHID) that use attack signatures in examining packet header behaviours to address the following questions:

1. Do the statistical analyses applied to different measurements express the dissimilar and similar behaviours of the packet headers?

2. Does the usage of a threshold mechanism increase actual attack detections by overcoming the suspected outlier data points drawbacks?

3. Do the features derived from the statistical approach provide a clear picture on the data and assist the integrated classifiers to minimize false positives and
false negatives and to maximize true positives and true negatives?

4. Does the transformation of unique attack behaviour into a signature structure minimize the detection time in ADS as well as increase the number of packets processed in a second?

1.5 Objectives of Research

The main objective of this research is to propose an Integrated Anomaly Detection Scheme (IADS) which integrates anomaly-based detection system (ADS) and signature-based detection system (SDS) approach for better and more rapid intrusion detection. As such, three different kinds of detection methods have been proposed in this thesis.

The specific objectives are to:

1. Propose a normal scoring approach, linear regression analysis and Cohen's-d measurement to identify the outlier data points which able to differentiate attack behaviours more precisely as statistical-based anomaly detection.

2. Propose a hybridized Naive Bayes and Random Forest classifier to differentiate and identify a similar behaviour of an attack and normal more accurately.

3. Propose a signature-based packet header intrusion detection method to reduce detection times in the ADS method.

1.6 Scope of Research

This research focuses on the ADS method which utilizes statistical analysis and hybridized classifiers between Naive Bayes and Random Forest to accurately identify intrusive and non-intrusive packet header behaviour with minimum false positives and false negatives as well as maximum true positives and true negatives. In addition, the detection method is designed such that it could operate accurately in identifying intrusion packet behaviours on various machines (multiple host network-based intrusion detection system, NIDS) and on a single machine (host-based intrusion detection system, HIDS). The scope is also on reducing detection time in the ADS method by creating known attack signature behaviours. The DARPA 1999 and ISCX 2012 intrusion detection benchmark dataset as well as Live-Data are used to assess the proposed, individual, and existing detection methods.
1.7 Research Contributions

The major contribution of this research is the creation of an Integrated Anomaly Detection Scheme (IADS) that could identify a number of intrusive and non-intrusive behaviours (false positive, false negative, true positive and true negative) more accurately and to minimize detection times via a signature-based packet header intrusion detection method by producing attack signatures for observable behaviour in contrast to ADS methods (without employing signatures).

The following are the contributions of this research:

1. Formulating a statistical method that could score packets, appraise the degree of the observed packet relationship through linear regression analysis, and Cohen’s-d as a threshold measurement to improve the detection rate of intrusion or attack by overcoming the outliers limitations. Experiments show that the proposed model is capable of maximizing actual attack-detectable data (true positives) more accurately compared to previous work.

2. Creating a hybridized classifier of Naive Bayes and Random Forest to differentiate and identify the similar actual behaviours of an attack and normal more accurately, particularly which able to decrease false negatives and false positives, and increase true negatives and true positives. These methods have shown remarkable outcomes and improvements for all aforesaid factors which directly improved the accuracy, detection, and false alarm rates as compared to the individual and existing methods.

3. Developing a Signature-based Packet Header Intrusion Detection method where signatures are created based on distinct attack behaviours after being classified by hybridized classifiers from the detection file for future detection and to decrease the detection time. Thus, the detection time is reduced upon utilizing signatures for detection purpose as compared to the Anomaly Detection Scheme (ADS) which performs intrusion detections without employing signatures.

1.8 Organization of Thesis

This section presents an outline of the entire thesis which is organized as follows:

Chapter 1 presents the introduction and includes among others the background, problem statement, research objectives and questions and contributions of the thesis.

Chapter 2 reviews related studies of the subject matter which includes intrusion detection systems (IDSs), statistical-based anomaly detection (SAD), and data mining-based anomaly detection (DMAD). The end of the chapter discusses the
related work within this field which employs statistical analysis and hybridized classifiers.

Chapter 3 provides a brief explanation of the research methodologies adopted in this research. The requirement analysis involved in the process of identification and investigation of the research requirement is detailed out. This chapter also describes how the proposed IADS is designed and implemented. In addition, the experimental design and experimental setup involving the amount of data applied and selection of specific applications to perform the research and evaluation criteria used to evaluate the performance is also highlighted.

Chapter 4 describes the proposed Integrated Anomaly Detection Scheme (IADS). A comprehensive discussion is provided on the components of IADS which is designed based on the Statistical-based Packet Header Anomaly Detection (SPHAD), Hybridized Naive Bayes and Random Forest Classifiers (NB+RF) and Signature-based Packet Header Intrusion Detection Method (SPHID). Each analysis involved in SPHAD and the NB+RF as well as the SPHID for formation of attack behaviour signatures is briefly explained in this chapter.

Chapter 5 presents the implementation of different detection methods in the proposed detection scheme using a MySql database, Matlab programming, and SQL script. The procedure for implementation is clearly explained by giving examples for each step which needs to be performed in this detection scheme.

Chapter 6 presents a performance evaluation of the IADS. The effectiveness of the proposed SPHAD, NB+RF and SPHID are assessed using a number of datasets and the detection results based on different criteria are illustrated and discussed.

Chapter 7 summarizes the entire thesis and recommendations on possible extensions of this research as future work.
REFERENCES


Jiawei Han, M. K. (2006). *Data Mining concepts and techniques* (Second., p. 800). USA: Morgan Kaufmann.


