Introducing $S$-Index into Factoring RSA Modulus via Lucas Sequences

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ABSTRACT

At any instance in the factoring algorithm, the accumulative result stands independently. In effect, there is no clear direction to manoeuvre whether to go left or right. General Lucas sequences are practically useful in cryptography. In the past quarter century, factoring large RSA modulo into its primes is one of the most important and most challenging problems in computational number theory. A factoring technique on RSA modulo is mainly hindered by the strong prime properties. The success of factoring few large RSA modulo within the last few decades has been due to computing prowess overcoming one strong prime of RSA modulo. In this paper, some useful properties of Lucas sequences shall be explored in factoring RSA modulo. This paper will also introduces the $S$-index formation in solving quadratic equation modulo $N$. The $S$-index pattern is very useful in designing an algorithm to factor RSA modulo. The $S$-index will add another comparative tool to better manoeuvre in a factoring process. On one hand, it shall remain a theoretical challenge to overcome the strong prime properties. On the other hand, it shall remain a computational challenge to achieve a running time within polynomial time to factor RSA modulo. This paper will propose an avenue to do both using general Lucas sequences.

Keywords: $S$-Index, Factoring RSA Modulus, Lucas Sequences.

1. Introduction

The complexity of real-world problems with an absence of sufficient theories and the lack of knowledge require sophisticated methods of accurate intelligent systems capable of reflecting practical decision on unforeseen cases (Czełalski, 2006).

In this paper, we have identified a practical S-shaped instance which can be used as a comparative index to the difficult factoring problem. While travelling along the quadratic domain, this proposed S-index function will be useful in determining of the location whether it is to the left or right of the center by comparing its concavity within the vicinity of its neighbourhood.

2. An Overview on S-index Function

An S-shaped function has been identified throughout modern computational sciences. Let us start from a continuous random variable $X$ with a simple probability density function (pdf) $f_X(x)$. Its cumulative probability function (cdf),

$$F_X(x) = \int_{-\infty}^{x} f_X(t)dt, \quad -\infty < x < \infty$$

forms an S-shape function also known as an ogif. A classical standard normal distribution pdf is in Figure 1.

![Standard Normal Distribution Function](image)

Figure 1: A standard normal distribution function from three standard deviation to the left and right of mean zero.

The cdf of $X$ has been plotted in Figure 2. Clearly, it follows a nice S-shaped function.
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Figure 2: A nice ogif from standard normal distribution function forms an S-shaped function.

An ideal transcendental sigmoid function is another good example. Let a basic sigmoid function be \( f(x) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-x}} \) on \( -\infty < x < \infty \) as shown in Figure 3. This sigmoid function is an odd function centered at the origin.

Figure 3: A sigmoid function forms an ideal S-shaped function.

An S-shape comparative index function has positive derivative throughout its domain. While its second derivative is always positive to the left of the center, changing a concavity direction at the center, its second derivative remains negative to the right of the center. In other words, there is a clear change of concavity at the center. It concaves up on the left but concaves down on the right of the center.

An S-shape comparative index function is also used in Fuzzy Logics. The shape of membership function is important for a particular problem since they effect on a fuzzy inference system. An example of S-shaped membership function

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Figure 4: An S-shaped membership function forms a practical comparative decision making index in Fuzzy Logics.

(SMF) is a spline-based curve mapping on the input vector $x$ to a membership value (or degree of membership) between 0 and 1. A typical example of SMF is as follows

$$f(x) = \begin{cases} 
0, & x \leq a \\
2 \left( \frac{x-a}{b-a} \right)^2, & a < x \leq \frac{a+b}{2} \\
1 - 2 \left( \frac{x-a}{b-a} \right)^2, & \frac{a+b}{2} < x < b \\
1, & b \leq x
\end{cases}$$

Figure 4 shows an example of an SMF with extreme parameters $a = -2$ and $b = 2$. Let us take a look at another mathematical instance. A sinc function is popular in signal processing fields. Let a sinc function be $f(x) = \frac{\sin x}{x}$ on $-3 < x < 3$ as shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5: A sinc function is a useful function in representing a natural signal.

Figure 6: A clear concavity behaviour can be observed in the derivative of a sinc function.

Let us take a look at the negative of its derivative. Unlike in previous examples, we want to observe a more extreme case. The negative derivative of this sinc function has been plotted in Figure 6. In this particular case, the $S$-shaped function goes beyond the extreme parameters $a = -2$ and $b = 2$ and continues on its concavity paths.

3. Lucas Sequences

General Lucas sequences have made significant contribution to the field of cryptography. Lucas sequence $V$ has been proposed to be used for public key cryptosystem (Smith and Lennon, 1993), in a manner similar to the famous RSA (Rivest et al., 1978), but using Lucas sequences modulo a composite number instead of exponentiation. It has stipulated to have the same security level as RSA for the same size key, but is about twice as slow. A special Lucas
sequence has been used to directly factor pseudo prime numbers especially Carmichael numbers (Abu et al., 2004).

An efficient computation of general Lucas sequences can be found in (Joye and Quisquater, 1996). Zhenxiang Zhang has shown on how to factor an RSA modulo into its primes near both multiples of group orders \( P - 1 \) or \( P + 1 \) and respectively \( Q - 1 \) or \( Q + 1 \) using Lucas sequences (Zhang, 2001). An asymmetric key GM cryptosystem has been developed by Shafi Goldwasser and Silvio Micali in 1982 (Goldwasser and Micali, 1984). It is semantically secure based on intractability of the quadratic residue problem modulo \( N = PQ \) where \( P \) and \( Q \) are large primes. The difficulties of decrypting the ciphertext without the key pair \((P, Q)\) is solely based on a comparative interactive challenge on whether a given ciphertext \( c \) is a quadratic residue modulo \( N \) when the Jacobi symbol for \( c \) is \(+1\).

The non-positional nature of Residue Number Systems (RNS) is very efficient in a single arithmetic computing without any hassle of carry propagations. Unlike in the common index number system, RNS has a drawback in comparison. There is no ease general method for magnitude comparison in RNS. This inability to compare two numbers whichever is larger makes it difficult to operate on large modulo efficiently especially in the field of cryptography (Sousa, 2007). The magnitude comparison in RNS is equivalent to the Comparative S-Index in this paper.

4. Criteria of Strong RSA Primes

Let \( N \) be the product of two primes, \( P \) and \( Q \). It may be desirable to use strong primes for \( P \) and \( Q \). These are prime numbers with certain properties that make the product \( N \) difficult to factor by known factoring methods. The selection of \( P \) and \( Q \) as strong primes has been recommended, prior to the year 2000, as a way to safeguard the well-known classical factoring algorithm (Rivest and Silverman, 1997). However, these basic strong prime criteria are independently imposed on \( P \) or \( Q \).

Among the properties of strong RSA modulo \( N = PQ \) are as follows.

**Criterion 1:** \( P - 1 \) and \( P + 1 \) consists of a large prime factor.

Let \( P - 1 = P_0^- \cdot P_1^- \cdot \ldots \cdot P_k^- \) and \( P + 1 = P_0^+ \cdot P_1^+ \cdot \ldots \cdot P_k^+ \). The largest prime factors \( P_k^- \) and \( P_k^+ \) should be larger than 256-bit for 512-bit \( P \).
Criterion 2: $Q - 1$ and $Q + 1$ consist of a large prime factor.

Let $Q - 1 = Q_0^− \cdot Q_1^− \cdots Q_{k−}^−$ and $Q + 1 = Q_0^+ \cdot Q_1^+ \cdots Q_{k+}^+$. Respectively, the largest prime factors $Q_{k−}^−$ and $Q_{k+}^+$ should be larger than 256-bit for 512-bit $Q$.

Criterion 3: Recursively, for each largest factor, $P_{k−}^− - 1$ and $P_{k+}^+ - 1$ must also consist of large enough prime factor, namely, $P_{k−}^−$ and $P_{k+}^+$ following the notation in Rivest and Silverman (1997).

Criterion 4: Each largest factor of the prime $Q_{k−}^− - 1$ and $Q_{k+}^+ - 1$ must also consist of large enough prime factor namely, $Q_{k−}^−$ and $Q_{k+}^+$ respectively.

Factoring the RSA modulo $N$ is well known to be infeasible. Recently, (Boudaoud, 2009) explores another practical approach to surmount this major difficulty by finding the factorization of an integer in a small neighbourhood of $N$ instead of $N$. Bakhtiari and Maarof (2012) pointed out that there are more than one set of decryption key $(d,N)$ on a given set of RSA encryption key $(e,N)$. However the distance between them is lcm$(P - 1, Q - 1)$ which is ruled by the basic strong prime criteria.

Let an elliptic curve be the set of points

$$E(a,b) = \{(x, y, z) : y^2z \equiv x^3 + axz^2 + bz^3 \pmod{p}\}$$

By the end of the century, it has been noted to be useless to concentrate on strong primes. It is unnecessary to protect against factoring attacks by building large prime factors into $P - 1$ or $P + 1$ since the adversary can instead attempt to overcome by finding an elliptic curve $E(a,b)$ whose size

$$P + 1 - 2\sqrt{P} \leq |E(a,b)| \leq P + 1 + 2\sqrt{p}$$

is smooth (Rivest and Silverman, 1997).

5. General Lucas Sequences

Given integer parameters $p > 2$ and $q > 0$, the general Lucas sequences give rise to two functions similar to exponentiation, namely, $U_n$ and $V_n$. 

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\[\begin{align*}
U_0 &= 0, U_1 &= 1, & U_n &= p \cdot U_{n-1} - q \cdot U_{n-2} \\
V_0 &= 2, V_1 &= p, & V_n &= p \cdot V_{n-1} - q \cdot V_{n-2}
\end{align*}\]

Calculating an element of a Lucas sequence can be done in a very similar pattern to exponentiation using a power modulo operation. It may be helpful to think of \(p\) as the base and the index \(n\) as the exponent. The closed forms of the general Lucas sequences are:

\[U_n = \frac{\alpha^n - \beta^n}{\alpha - \beta} \quad \text{and} \quad V_n = \alpha^n + \beta^n,\]

where \(\alpha\) and \(\beta\) are the two roots of the quadratic polynomial \(x^2 - px + q\).

These classical Lucas sequences \(U_n\) and \(V_n\) are generated from second order recursions with integer variables \((p, q)\) and discriminant \(\delta = p^2 - 4q\). In the case of \((p, q) = (1, 1)\), the Lucas sequence \(U_n\) is popularly known as Fibonacci numbers, and their companions \(V_n\) are the Lucas numbers. The requirement on \(P\) and \(Q\), to be strong primes by making \(P \pm 1\) and \(Q \pm 1\) to have large prime factors, may no longer appear to be adequately substantiated in the view of the best factorisation algorithms known today.

Pollard Rho Method basically can achieve rapid factorization if \(P - 1\) consists of only small prime factors. On the other hand, similar result can be said also about \(P + 1\). This method of integer factorisation is originally described in Williams (1982). It can find a large factor \(P\) very quickly when \(P + 1\) is composed of only small factors. Zhang (2001) has also shown how the general Lucas Sequence can be employed to exploit any weak primes from both sides, the \(P - 1\) and \(P + 1\).

6. Criteria on General Lucas Sequences

Let \(N = PQ\). For a given parameters \(p\) and \(q\), take \(\delta = p^2 - 4q\). Let \(\epsilon_P = \left(\frac{\delta}{P}\right)\) and \(\epsilon_Q = \left(\frac{\delta}{Q}\right)\). The subscript to the epsilon, \(\epsilon\) is usually left out within the context of known prime \(P\) or \(Q\) and \(\epsilon_N = \left(\frac{\delta}{N}\right) = \left(\frac{\delta}{P}\right) \cdot \left(\frac{\delta}{Q}\right) = \epsilon_P \cdot \epsilon_Q\). For instance,
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$$\epsilon_P = \left( \frac{\delta}{P} \right) = \begin{cases} +1, & \text{\( \delta \) is quadratic residue \pmod{P}} \\ -1, & \text{\( \delta \) is non-quadratic residue \pmod{P}} \end{cases}$$

Here the criteria of general Lucas sequences are being compactly summarised. They are very practical tools in factoring process.

![Figure 7: $U_n \pmod{N}$ sequence is odd with respect to the center period $C$.](image1)

![Figure 8: $V_n \pmod{N}$ sequence is even with respect to the center period $C$.](image2)

**Criterion 1:** All the operations here are done modulo $N$. The maximum period of the general Lucas sequences $U$ and $V$ modulo $N$ of parameters $p$ and $q$ is $C = \text{lcm}(P - \epsilon_P)(Q - \epsilon_Q)$. This criteria has been regarded as a generalisation of the Euler totient function for Lucas functions, the Lehmer totient function (Lehmer, 1990).

**Criterion 2:** The Lucas sequence $U$ is odd while $V$ is even with respect to the period as shown in the Figures 7 and 8 above, i.e. $U_{kC-n} = -U_{kC+n}$ and $V_{kC-n} = V_{kC+n}$ for any integer $k$ and positive integer $n$ from the center period $C = 0$. 

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Let the parameters of general Lucas sequences be \((p, q) = (6, 1)\). The values of both Lucas sequences have been listed in Table 1. The graphs in Figures 7 and 8 above show typical characteristics of an odd sequence \(U_n \pmod{N}\) and an even sequence \(V_n \pmod{N}\) for \(N = PQ = 4073 \cdot 8209 = 33435257\). This criterion has made Lucas sequence \(V\) appear to be a better reference than \(U\) in the LUC public-key system.

**Criterion 3:** The center values of the general Lucas sequences \(U\) and \(V\) modulo RSA primes are as follows:

i. \(U_{k(P-\epsilon)} \equiv 0 \pmod{P}\) for any positive integer \(k\).

ii. \(V_{k(P-\epsilon)} \equiv 2q^{\frac{k}{1-\epsilon}} \pmod{P}\) for any positive integer \(k\).

iii. \(U_{k(Q-\epsilon)} \equiv 0 \pmod{Q}\) for any positive integer \(k\).

iv. \(V_{k(Q-\epsilon)} \equiv 2q^{\frac{k}{1-\epsilon}} \pmod{P}\) for any positive integer \(k\).

Preferably the second parameter \(q\) is set to be one(1) so that the sequence \(V\) will always have consistent output 2 modulo \(N\) at a multiple instance of period \(C\).

**Criterion 4:** These following characteristics have been observed based on the previous research on general Lucas sequences. Most researchers insist on Criterion 3 as a more practical form for factoring purposes. Nevertheless, these criteria are more flexible in factoring angles to choose from.

i. \(U_{j(P-\epsilon)+L} - U_{k(P-\epsilon)+L} \equiv 0 \pmod{P}\)

ii. \(V_{j(P-\epsilon)+L} - V_{k(P-\epsilon)+L} \equiv 0 \pmod{P}\)

iii. \(U_{j(Q-\epsilon)+L} - U_{k(Q-\epsilon)+L} \equiv 0 \pmod{Q}\)

iv. \(V_{j(Q-\epsilon)+L} - V_{k(Q-\epsilon)+L} \equiv 0 \pmod{Q}\)

for some positive integers \(j\) and \(k\). It is a necessary condition that \(j \neq k\) for integer \(-R < L < R\) where \(R\) is typically referred to the absolute difference between the primes \(P\) and \(Q\). This last criterion is the most useful but by far the most elusive characteristic of the general Lucas sequences in designing a factoring algorithm. It is also noted that Criterion 4 is useful for factoring algorithm if it does not happen simultaneously i.e. the sequence \(U\) or \(V\) is not equal to the ones modulo \(N\).

**Criterion 5:** Alternatively, all the criteria above may be summarised in terms of primes \(P\) and \(Q\) as follows. There are integers \(0 \leq a_j, b_k < Q\) and \(0 \leq c_j, d_k < P\) such that

i. \(U_{j(P-\epsilon)+L} = a_j \cdot P + U_L \pmod{N}\)
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Table 1: The values of general Lucas sequences \( U_n \pmod{N} \) and \( V_n \pmod{N} \) near the center \( C \).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>( U_n ) ( \pmod{N} )</th>
<th>( V_n ) ( \pmod{N} )</th>
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ii. \( V_k(P-\epsilon) = b_k \cdot P + V_L \mod N \)
iii. \( U_j(Q-\epsilon) = c_j \cdot Q + U_L \mod N \)
iv. \( V_k(Q-\epsilon) = d_k \cdot Q + V_L \mod N \)

for every integer \( L \). Thus, an RSA prime can be extracted respectively by taking the greatest common divisor as follows;

i. \( P = \gcd(U_j(P-\epsilon) + U_L, N) \)
ii. \( P = \gcd(V_k(P-\epsilon) - V_L, N) \)
iii. \( Q = \gcd(U_j(Q-\epsilon) + U_L, N) \)
iv. \( Q = \gcd(V_k(Q-\epsilon) - V_L, N) \)

7. New Proposal on RSA Factoring

On one hand, it shall remain a theoretical challenge to overcome the strong prime properties. On the other hand, it shall remain a computational challenge to keep the running time within polynomial time to factor RSA modulo.

According to the Proposition 3.3 in (Khadir, 2008) Let \( N \) be the product of two prime factors \( P \) and \( Q \) where \( 2 < P < Q \). If we can compute efficiently two odd integers \( r \) and \( s \) such that \( s < P \) and \( |sQ - rP| \leq 2^{\frac{K+4}{3}} \) where \( K \) is the bit-size of the integer \( rsN \), then we can compute the factors \( P \) and \( Q \).

In this paper, a more relaxed requirement shall be made. Suppose \( \epsilon_N = \left( \frac{P}{2} \right) \cdot \left( \frac{Q}{2} \right) = \epsilon_P \cdot \epsilon_Q = (+1)(+1) = 1 \). Let \( R < P < Q \) such that \( R = Q - P \).

\[
N - 1 = (P - 1)(Q - 1) + (P - 1) + (Q - 1)
= (P - 1)(Q - 1) + 2(P - 1) + R = (P - 1)(Q - 1) + 2(Q - 1) - R
\]

For a given odd \( w \),

\[
N - 1 + w = (P - 1)(Q - 1) + 2(P - 1) + (R + w)
= (P - 1)(Q - 1) + 2(Q - 1) - (R - w)
\]
and

\[
N - 1 - w = (P - 1)(Q - 1) + 2(P - 1) + (R - w)
= (P - 1)(Q - 1) + 2(Q - 1) - (R + w)
\]

Preferably, \( w = 1 \) is a good starting point.
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Let \( V_n \) be the special Lucas sequence with parameters \( (p, q) = (p, 1) \) so that \( p^2 - 4 \) is a quadratic residue of \( N \). Then we need to set a special even Lucas sequence such that \( V_0 = 2, V_1 = p, V_2 = p^2 - 2 \) and \( V_3 = p \cdot V_2 - V_1 = p \cdot (p^2 - 2) - p = p^3 - 3p \).

Let \( N_0 = N - 1 \). Suppose an odd indexed sequence only is readily available. Nevertheless, it is sufficient to generate the values of \( V \) sequences along other large odd indexes. Since \( N_0 - w \) and \( N_0 + w \) are odd, \( V \) sequence modulo \( N \) can be computed using a special algorithm below. The running time of this textbook Algorithm 1 is still \( O(n^3) \) compared to the running time of general Lucas sequences.

**Algorithm 1** A textbook algorithm to compute an odd Lucas sequence \( V \)

**Function Odd \( (p, K, N) \)**

1: Set \( K = b_{n-1}b_{n-2} \ldots b_2b_1b_0 \) be odd such that \( b_{n-1} = 1 \) and \( b_0 = 1 \).
2: Left = \( V_1 \), Right = \( V_3 \).
3: for \( i = n - 2 \) down to 1 do
4:  if \( b_i = 0 \) then
5:     Right = Left \cdot Right - p \pmod{N}
6:  end if
7:  if \( b_i = 1 \) then
8:     Left = Left^2 - 2 \pmod{N}
9:     Right = Right^2 - 2 \pmod{N}
10: end if
11: end for
12: Return Left

Following the Lucas sequence \( V \) criterion 5, there are integers \( a, b, c \) and \( d \) such that

\[
V_{(N-1)-w} = aP + V_{R-w} = bQ + V_{R+w} \quad (1)
\]

\[
V_{(N-1)+w} = cP + V_{R+w} = dQ + V_{R-w} \quad (2)
\]

Let us compute

\[
S = V_{(N-1)-w} + V_{(N-1)+w} \equiv V_{R-w} + V_{R+w} \pmod{N}
\]

\[
T = V_{(N-1)-w} \cdot V_{(N-1)+w} \equiv V_{R-w} \cdot V_{R+w} \pmod{N}
\]

Let us scan for a candidate of \( x \) of \( V_r \) and \( y \) of \( V_s \), respectively the satisfy the conditions

\[
x + y \equiv S \pmod{N} \quad (3)
\]

\[
x \cdot y \equiv T \pmod{N} \quad (4)
\]

From (3), let \( y = S - x \), equation (4) will become,

\[
x \cdot y = x \cdot (S - x) \equiv T \pmod{N}
\]

(5)

Consequently, the problem has been reduced down to solving the quadratic equation modulo \( N \). We shall search for the root of the function

\[
f(x) = x \cdot (S - x) - T \pmod{N}.
\]

Let us take the \((2m + 1)\) terms at one time as the error function,

\[
g(x) = \sum_{i=x-m}^{x+m} f(i)
\]

A sample case for \( N = 4073 \cdot 8209 = 33435257 \) is made here. Let the Lucas sequence parameters \((p, q) = (6, 1)\), \( m = 1 \) and \( w = 3 \). From (1) and (2),

\[
V_{(N-1)-3} = 146 \cdot P + V_{R-3} = -146 \cdot Q + V_{R+3}
\]

\[
V_{(N-1)+3} = 1561 \cdot P + V_{R+3} = -1561 \cdot Q + VR - 3
\]

The strategy is to locate the values of \( V_{R-3} \) and \( V_{R+3} \). The error function has been plotted within the surrounding region of \( V_{(N-1)+3} \) in the Figure 9. We would like to collect the points near zeros.

Let us take the square of the error function so that we can see the error function value near zeros as depicted in Figure 10. The yellow dot is the target value for \( V_{(N-1)+w} \). The touchdown points have been observed here as shown in Figure 11. The errors are probabilistically getting larger as the points are moving away from the center critical point. They are much easier to locate as the points of local minima as shown in Figure 10. The green dot is the target value for \( V_{(N-1)+3} \).
Introducing $S$-Index into Factoring RSA Modulus via Lucas Sequences

Figure 10: Taking the square on the error function.

Figure 11: The point of local minima on the error function.

It has also been observed that the distances between the local minima is getting smaller as the points go further away from the center. The list of points $x$ has been plotted in the Figure 12 which form the $S$ pattern.

According to basic calculus, a point $x$ to the left of the critical inflection point $z$, is said to be concaved up and to the right of the critical inflection point $z$ is concaved down respectively.

8. Discussion

In order to check on its concavity, we need to capture at least three points along the way. Let the three points are $(x_0, y_0)$, $(x_1, y_1)$ and $(x_2, y_2)$. An estimate sign of the second derivative will be determined by its concavity via the difference between its two consecutive derivatives as follows,

$$y''_{0} = y_{12} - y_{01} = \frac{y_2 - y_1}{x_2 - x_1} - \frac{y_1 - y_0}{x_1 - x_0}$$

Figure 12: The point of local minima on the error function forms the S shape.

If the neighbourhood region has positive second derivative or concaves up, the point of interest must be located on the left of the center. In the case of the neighbourhood region has negative second derivative or concaves down, the point of interest must be located on the right of the center.

Checking on 3 consecutive `touch-down' at any given point \( x \), will give us a good estimate of the concavity of the surrounding region. A major hurdle in reducing the sub-exponential running time in breaking RSA down to super polynomial running time is the comparative mechanism. At any one time in the factoring algorithm, there has been no mechanism to compare the current position and where to go next. In effect, there is no direction to maneuver whether to go left or right. The S index pattern is very useful in designing an algorithm to factor RSA modulo.

For instance, in order to determine the quadratic residue on ciphertext \( c \) of \( N \), it suffices to predict whether the Lucas sequence \( V \) follow the S-index pattern case 0 or case 1. The S-index pattern follows the similar behaviour on all root of the quadratic equation (5) at \( V_{(N-1)-3} \), \( V_{(N-1)+3} \), \( V_{R-3} \) and \( V_{R+3} \). Rather than locating the periodic center of general Lucas sequences \( U \) and \( V \) as shown in Figures 7 and 8, it is much easier and we stand better chances in locating the S pattern on the quadratic equation (5) modulo \( N \).
9. Conclusion

Factoring large integers into primes is one of the most important and most difficult problems in computational number theory. A factoring technique on RSA modulo has been previously hindered by the strong prime properties. Few algorithms have overcome the strong prime criteria of RSA modulo. Nevertheless, they are still subjected to the size of the primes. In this paper, some useful properties of general Lucas sequences have been explored in factoring RSA modulo. A major hurdle in reducing the sub-exponential running time in breaking RSA down to super polynomial running time is the comparative mechanism. At any instance in the factoring algorithm, the accumulative result stands independently. In effect, there is no clear direction to maneuver whether to go left or right. This paper has introduced the S-index formation in solving quadratic equation modulo $N$. The S-index pattern is very useful in designing an algorithm to factor RSA modulo. Nevertheless, it shall remain a computational challenge to see whether the running time of factoring RSA modulo can be reduced down to a super polynomial time.

References


*Malaysian Journal of Mathematical Sciences*


