Unit Trust Performance Measurement: the Snail Trail Approach

TAN YEN KENG
Department of Accounting and Finance, Faculty of Economics and Management,
Universiti Putra Malaysia, 43400 UPM, Serdang, Selangor, Malaysia

Keywords: unit trust, Snail-Trail analysis, equity growth funds

ABSTRACT
Unit trust is an investment scheme that offers investors a well diversified portfolio managed by a professional fund manager or organisation. The investment horizon is medium to long term depending on the stipulated objective of the unit trust. Due to the long holding period and compounding effect, a slight difference in the annual rate of returns can be very detrimental to the investor. Therefore the performance of a unit trust as well as the fund manager must be carefully evaluated before committing to the fund. As we know, a high rate of returns in a single period can be very misleading if we do not study the volatility of the historical returns. Risk adjusted returns offer a solution to this problem, but this is only a "snapshot" performance measurement analysis. Snail-Trail analysis was introduced to overcome these drawbacks and better portray the dynamic history of fund manager’s performance.

17 equity growth funds were selected for the purpose of this study. From the snail-Ttrail analysis, two promising unit trusts were found to be Asia Progress and KLMF Growth. Both funds have shown improvement in relative performance from the “high return high risk” and “low return low risk” quadrant moving up to “high return low risk”, the most favourable, quadrant. Meanwhile, three funds have been classified as below average as the snail trail diagrams shown deteriorating performance. These three funds are BHLB High Growth, KLMF Industry, and KLMF Aggressive Growth, the performance of which has been falling rapidly over recent years,
from the "high return low risk" quadrant to "low return high risk" quadrant. Four unit trusts showing the most consistency in fund risk-return performance are SBB Premium Capital, HLB Growth, OSK Equity and RHB Capital.

**INTRODUCTION**

Unit trust is an investment vehicle that pools money from investors and the pooled fund will then be invested in a diversified portfolio. The fund will be managed by professional fund managers or asset management organisations on behalf of unit trusts investors. Investors can select the unit trust based on their investment objectives, investment strategy and risk tolerance level.

In the selection process, besides the above mentioned investor characteristics, the relative performance of the unit trust also plays an important role. Here comes the question: what do you refer to when you want to know the performance of a particular fund? We used to refer to the "league table" showing various unit trusts ranked according to their returns, or the advertisements which highlight the impressive high rates of return over the last "x" months or years.

A high rate of returns in a single period can be very misleading if we do not study the volatility of the historical returns. Therefore the risk-return tradeoffs must be studied. A diagram with standard deviation of the returns on the horizontal axis as a proxy for risk and the rate of return on the vertical axis can be plotted. This diagram is a step forward and allows explicit risk-return tradeoffs to be made. This traditional risk-return diagram presents a single or static snapshot in time over a set period. As discussed in Balzer (1991), to further improve the diagram, multiple points, each representing a set of risk-return for a specific period can be plotted on the same diagram. This diagram portrays a dynamic history of a single fund manager's performance. However, this presentation is useful only to show how a fund manager's performance has varied over time. It fails to reveal how much of that performance is due to the manager's unique skill and how much is due to fortuitous market movements enjoyed by most managers.

A very good indication of the skill component can be obtained by constructing a relative risk-return history, where the median risk and median return (for an appropriate universe of fund managers) are subtracted from the results. This process highlights a manager's value-adding and risk-reduction skills relative to its peer group.

Unlike the traditional risk-return diagram, the snail trail approach not only shows results relative to the median or average fund manager, but is a robust tool for comparing fund managers' performance.

**METHODOLOGY**

The relationship between risk and returns can be graphically illustrated. Relative return is plotted on the vertical axis and relative risk is plotted on the horizontal axis.

The first point on the risk-return graph is plotted as usual. The beginning and end points of the period are then rolled forward by one quarter and the return and risk for the new period are calculated and plotted on the same graph. By repeating this process, a trajectory is traced out dynamically in risk-return space.

After the compound average annual returns over the period (4 quarters) are calculated, the median returns for the same period for the universe of pooled funds are subtracted to give the relative returns.

To measure risk, there are a number of alternative computations. As in Grinblatt et al. (1994) and Woodward (1983), the most commonly accepted measure of risk, standard deviation of returns, has been chosen for these analysis. The standard deviation of quarterly returns over the period is calculated and annualised using the standard factor (which implicitly assumes a random walk stochastic model for the return series). The relative risk is then calculated by subtracting the median standard deviation for the group of fund managers and is plotted on the horizontal axis.

It is important to note that the horizontal axis is not the standard deviation of the relative returns, but the relative standard deviation of the total returns. Use of the former would show how well a particular fund manager tracked the median. This might or might not be a useful measure depending on one’s purpose. A low figure would simply indicate that the manager has nicely tracked the median, which itself might be undesirably volatile. On the other hand, a
low figure for relative standard deviation, as defined in this paper, implies low volatility of returns in the absolute sense, which is clearly desirable.

After the first point is plotted, the period is rolled forward one quarter and the calculation is repeated. One of the major advantages of the above rolling approach is that, all results are revealed — good or bad. The performance figures used in this paper are “after fee”.

Fairly obvious, desirable above median returns appear above the horizontal median return line and less-desirable below-median results appear below it. Similarly, below-median volatility appears on the left of the diagram and above median volatility on the right. The most desirable region is on the top left “high return low risk” (HL) quadrant, while the least desirable is the bottom right “low return high risk” (LH) quadrant.

Irrespective of the absolute position of a set of points on the graph, the tightness of their grouping is a direct indication of the consistency of a manager’s risk-return performance.

Seventeen unit trust funds were selected for the purpose of this study. These funds are categorised as growth and equity fund in Chong (1999). These funds are from EPF approved unit trust companies. Only funds with more than 100 million units in circulation will be included. By definition, a growth fund concentrates on investing in securities with growth potential. Growth may come in the form of the invested company’s growth or expansion, and capital appreciation. Growth fund, also known as equity fund, invests mainly in shares traded on the stock exchange. Equity funds can be made up of local shares, shares of unlisted companies, or shares listed on foreign stock exchanges.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

One way of visualising the relative risk-return relationship is to think of fixing the median “crosshairs” on a conventional risk-return diagram in the centre of the page and then watching how a manager moves in relation to them as the period of analysis is rolled forward in time.

Three funds with distinctive relative risk-return performance history have been selected for discussion.

**BHLB Pacific High Growth Fund**

With the objective of achieving high capital gains through investments in companies with high growth prospects as stated in Chong (1999), BHLB H Growth allocated more than 70% (73% as of 14 April 99) of the total investment in equity assets.

*Fig. 1:* The dynamic snail trail diagram demonstrates the relative 4-quarter return/risk performance history of BHLB H Growth. Prior to 96Q3, BHLB H Growth was in the “low return low risk” quadrant. However, the relative performance of BHLB H Growth improved gradually and moved up to the upper left quadrant, which is the “high return low risk” quadrant. The snail trail diagram indicated BHLB H Growth fund manager has read the Asian financial crisis right. This outstanding relative performance exhibits the superior risk-reduction and value-added skills of BHLB H Growth fund manager compared to the peer group; however the good performance was not upheld. The performance history exhibits poor performance in the post-crash period, when the snail trail descended from the “high return low risk” quadrant to “low return low risk” quadrant, and further fell into “low return high risk” quadrant in 1999.

As a whole, from the snail trail diagram, we can conclude that the performance of BHLB H Growth in pre- and post-crisis period was not very outstanding (i.e. in the “low risk low return” quadrant and “low return high risk” quadrant). But performance history has shown the ability of the fund manager in lowering the risk as well as improving returns during the economic crisis indicating the superior capability of the fund manager in countering the financial turmoil.

**KLMF Regular Saving**

*Fig. 2:* From the snail trail diagram, we can see that the relative performance history of KLMF R Saving is not very consistent over time. This is a very good example of dramatic changes in performance. In 1996, KLMF R Saving was in the “low return high risk” quadrant, and later advanced into the “high return high risk” quadrant. During the early stage of the financial crisis, KLMF R Saving was in the “high return low risk” quadrant. However, the favourable performance was not maintained very long. After (98Q1-98Q4), KLMF R Saving performance has
been falling, from the “low return low risk” quadrant to “low return high risk” or the unfavourable quadrant. This example shows that the single snapshot approach can be very misleading especially when the single period superior performance during the financial crisis is highlighted and promoted to the public.

As KLMF R Saving's objective is to achieve long-term capital growth while maintaining a steady growth in income, it invested heavily in fixed income securities (56%) and the money market (20%) compared to other growth funds in this study. With more than 70% of the total funds invested in non-equity instruments during the financial crisis, KLMF R Saving was able to minimise risk while securing desirable returns on investment. This might explain the KLMF R Saving performance history plots being in the above-median return quadrant with below average risk during the economic slow down. The decision of the KLMF R Saving fund manager to reallocate the assets (from equity to bond and cash) during the crisis added value to the fund as well as minimised risk.
However, during the pre-crisis period, the performance of KLMF R Saving was below average. Looking at the trend where the last point of the snail trail diagram shows a fall from "low return low risk" quadrant to "low return high risk" quadrant, might signal unfavourable future performance. From the dramatic movement of the KLMF R Saving snail trail, one should be aware of how dangerous it can be to neglect the risk dimension or the performance history of a fund.

**MBF Growth Fund**

Fig. 3: From the diagram, the performance history of MBF Growth indicated that MBF Growth is relatively more risky as the snail trail plots were moving on the right-region most of the time. Nevertheless, the relative risk increased dramatically during the financial crisis. The relative performance of MBF Growth was unfavourable (i.e. located in "low return high risk" quadrant) compared to many other growth funds studied. However, the relative return has shown some improvement along with the regional economy recovery but the relative risk is still higher than average. The last few plots of snail trail indicated a recent movement from the "high return high risk" quadrant to "low return low risk" quadrant exhibiting a reduction in return volatility.

As a whole, we can comment that the performance of MBF Growth is moving in tandem with aggregate market performance. The objective of the fund i.e. to achieve growth through capital appreciation by investing in high growth companies in Malaysia and Asia Pacific region, might give us an insight on the high return volatility and explain the performance of MBF Growth which is closely affected by the regional equity market movement.

**Overall Performance of 17 Funds**

From the appendices, using snail trail analysis, the most promising unit trusts are Asia Progress (Appendix 2) and KLMF Growth (Appendix 8). Both funds have shown improved relative performance from the "high return high risk" and "low return low risk" quadrant to "high return low risk" or the favourable quadrant.

Four unit trusts namely SBB PCapital (Appendix 18), HLB Growth (Appendix 7), OSK Equity (Appendix 15) and RHB Capital (Appendix 17) exhibit concentrated plots around the median return and risk. The tightness of their snail trail plots is a direct indication of the consistency of a fund’s risk-return performance. BBMB Prime (Appendix 3) has been showing a risk reduction trend.

Three funds are classified as below average as the snail trail diagrams show deteriorating performance. These funds are BHLB HGrowth (Appendix 5), KLMF Industry (Appendix 9), and KLMF A Growth (10), where the relative performance has been falling rapidly over recent
Tan Yen Keng

years, from “high return low risk” quadrant to “low return high risk” quadrant.

Seven other unit trusts did not exhibit any significant changes in the relative performance history. Most of these 7 funds remained in the same quadrant throughout the study period or moved from/to “high return high risk” (HH) quadrant to/from “low return low risk” (LL) quadrant. Moving between these two quadrants basically is indifferent in terms of risk/return tradeoffs. These 7 funds are: KLMF Regular (remained in LL) (Appendix 11); MBf Growth (maintained in HH) (Appendix 14); ASM (P) and ASM FPF (from HH to LL) (Appendix 12-13); BHLB Emerging (from HL to HH and LL) (Appendix 4); BIMB First (from LL to HH) (Appendix 6); and Pacific Pearl (from LH to LL) (Appendix 16).

CONCLUSION

From the findings, we discovered that some unit trusts have undergone quite significant, even dramatic, changes over the study period. The traditional risk-return “snapshot” fails to highlight changing performance and it fails to reveal how much of that performance is due to the manager’s unique skill and how much is due to fortuitous market movements enjoyed by most managers.

Unit trust is a medium to long term investment instrument. Therefore the initial selection process of the fund is very important. Any slight difference in annual returns can turn into a very big variance at the end of the investment horizon. For instance, 2% difference in the annual rate of returns can be magnified into 21.9% variation in the total returns in 10 years. From the snail trail analysis, we know that some funds might have more than 30% difference in their relative annual rates of returns. Therefore, it is advisable that potential or even existing unit trust investors be more diligent in the selection process and might want to include this snail trail approach as an additional analysis.

For investment purposes, investors should avoid unit trusts that are consistently staying in “low return high risk” quadrant. Unit trusts with very inconsistent snail trail plots over time are also undesirable because the dramatic movement indicates very volatile returns, and in the long term, total holding period returns might deviate very much from the targeted rate. Unit trusts located in the “high return low risk” quadrant are preferred and followed by those located in “low return low risk” or “high return high risk” quadrants. Investors with different investment objectives and risk tolerance level might be interested in investing in funds located in these two regions.

Again, the dynamic performance history will save us from the pit-fall, which we might be deceived into believing by the exaggerated “x” period rate of returns as advertised. As a long-term investor, we should select our investment vehicle with great caution and not be misled by the high return figure of any single period. Instead, consistent long term above average returns with low risk is most desirable.

REFERENCES


APPENDIX 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Unit Trust Fund</th>
<th>Type of Fund</th>
<th>Units in Circulation (million) 1998/99</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Asia UT Malaysia Progress Fund</td>
<td>Growth, Equity</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>BBMB Prime Fund</td>
<td>Growth, Equity</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>BHLB Pacific Emerging Co. Growth Fund</td>
<td>Growth, Equity</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>BHLB Pacific High Growth Fund</td>
<td>Growth, Equity</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>BIMB UT First Fund</td>
<td>Syariah, Growth, Equity</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>HLB Growth Fund</td>
<td>Growth, Equity</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>KLMF Growth Fund</td>
<td>Growth, Equity</td>
<td>658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>KLMF Industry Fund</td>
<td>Growth, Equity</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>KLMF Aggressive Growth Fund</td>
<td>Growth, Equity</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>KLMF Regular Saving</td>
<td>Growth, Equity</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>MBF Growth Fund</td>
<td>Growth, Equity</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>OSK-UOB Equity Trust</td>
<td>Growth, Equity</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Pacific Pearl Fund</td>
<td>Growth, Equity</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>RHB Capital Fund</td>
<td>Growth, Equity</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>SBB Premium Capital Fund</td>
<td>Growth, Equity</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>ASM First Public Fund</td>
<td>Growth, Equity</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>ASM Premier Fund</td>
<td>Growth, Equity</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Unit Trust Fund</th>
<th>Fund Manager 1998/99</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Asia UT Malaysia Progress Fund</td>
<td>Mushthaq Ahmad Ibrahim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>BBMB Prime Fund</td>
<td>Koh Huat Soon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>BHLB Emerging Co. Growth Fund</td>
<td>Lee Chiah Cheang (external investment advisor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>BHLB Pacific High Growth Fund</td>
<td>Lee Chiah Cheang (external investment advisor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>BIMB UT First Fund</td>
<td>Abdul Rahim Abu Bakar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>HLB Growth Fund</td>
<td>Arnold Lim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>KLMF Growth Fund</td>
<td>Edmond Cheah Swee Leng</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>KLMF Industry Fund</td>
<td>Edmond Cheah Swee Leng</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>KLMF Aggressive Growth Fund</td>
<td>Chong Chang Choong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>KLMF Regular Saving</td>
<td>Chong Chang Choong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>MBF Growth Fund</td>
<td>Philip Tan Chek Boon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>OSK-UOB Equity Trust</td>
<td>Lee Seng Young</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Pacific Pearl Fund</td>
<td>Chong Sui San</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>RHB Capital Fund</td>
<td>David Lee Chuen Chieh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>SBB Premium Capital Fund</td>
<td>Pearl Wong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>ASM First Public Fund</td>
<td>Zalinah A Hamid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>ASM Premier Fund</td>
<td>Razali Haron</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX 2
Asia Ut Malaysia Progress Fund (Asia Progress)

APPENDIX 3
BBMB PRIME FUND (BBMB PRIME)

APPENDIX 4
BHLB Pacific Emerging Co. Growth Fund (BHLB Emerging)
Unit Trust Performance Measurement: the Snail Trail Approach

APPENDIX 5
NHLB Pacific High Growth (BHLB Hgrowth)

APPENDIX 6
BIMB UT First (BIMB First)

APPENDIX 7
HLB Growth Fund (HLB Growth)

APPENDIX 8
KLMF Industry Fund (KLMF Growth)
APPENDIX 9
KLMF Industry Fund (KLMF Industy)

APPENDIX 10
KLMF Aggressive Growth Fund (KLMF AGrowth)

APPENDIX 11
KLMF Regular Saving (KLMF RSaving)

APPENDIX 12
ASM Premier Fund
Unit Trust Performance Measurement: the Snail Trail Approach

APPENDIX 13
ASM First Public Fund (ASM FPF)

APPENDIX 14
MBF Growth Fund (MBF Growth)

APPENDIX 15
OSK-UOB Equity Trust (OSK Equity)

APPENDIX 16
Pacific Pearl Fund (Pacific Pearl)
APPENDIX 17
RHB Capital Fund (RHB Capital)

APPENDIX 18
SBB Premium Capital Fund (SBB PCapital)
Shamsher Mohamad & Taufiq Hassan

consistently available for traders who have full use of proceeds. One crucial assumption driving this result is the ability to sell short the cash index (or a subset of stocks in the KLSE CI). The results also reveal that the stock index futures contract pricing is not monotonic but rather varies over time with periods of both greater and lesser efficiency.

INTRODUCTION

A futures contract is an agreement between a seller and a buyer that calls for the seller to deliver to the buyer a specified quantity and grade of an identified commodity, at a fixed time in the future, and at a price agreed in the contract. All futures contracts are traded on designated futures exchanges. Futures markets had their start in agriculture, with the introduction of commodity futures contracts that provided farmers, distributors, and processors of agricultural products to shift the price risk of their output to speculators. Financial futures contracts based on financial instruments as the underlying asset were first introduced in 1972 with the introduction of currency futures traded on the International Monetary Market. In 1975 the Chicago Board of Trade pioneered trading in interest rate futures and the stock index futures were introduced in 1982 on the Kansas City Board of Trade (KCBT).

Stock index futures contract specify an equity index as the underlying asset. It is an agreement between a seller and a buyer to respectively deliver and take delivery of a basket of shares that makes up the index, at an agreed price at a specific future date. However, these contracts are usually cash-settled avoiding the need to deliver all the shares that make up the underlying stock index.

Stock index futures contracts provide financial executives and money managers' a risk management tool to reduce potential losses on a cash position.

Futures provide a more effective and flexible alternative to adjusting the returns and risk characteristics of a cash position. For example, using either betas or portfolio analysis only allows the investor limited flexibility in changing the amount of risk in the portfolio. Moreover, betas and portfolio risk measures change over time. It also provides speculators a degree of leverage that typically is not available with other instruments and allow speculators to change their risk profiles.

Besides helping to hedge risk and alter the risk profile of a cash portfolio, stock index futures contracts also perform the price discovery function. That is the stock index futures contract prices reflect the combined views of a large number of buyers and sellers as to the current supply/demand situation and the relationship of prices 12 to 18 months hence. It is an expression of opinions concerning today's expectations about the level of market or stock index performance at some point in the future. As conditions change, opinions change and prices of futures contracts also change. The expected changes in futures prices become important inputs for market participants in making effective hedging and speculative decisions.

Besides the hedging and speculation, stock index futures can be used for arbitrage activities. Arbitrage is risk-free and costless activity that aligns the fair price of a futures contract with the current price of the contract in the market. The logic underlying index arbitrage is that the theoretical futures price should equal that of a portfolio of stocks composing the index plus the net cost of carrying the stocks until delivery. If the futures price exceeds the price of the portfolio by the net cost of carry, it would be profitable for the arbitrager to buy the index portfolio and sell futures against it. If the futures price were less than the price of portfolio and the costs, it would be profitable for the arbitrager to buy the futures contract and sell the index portfolio. Such actions force the futures price back toward the fair price. The buying of the futures contracts is usually done in anticipation of share price increase and selling in anticipation of share price decrease. However, expectations can be wrong, and if expectations are wrong then the selling of the underlying shares (in case of buying the futures contracts when they are undervalued) and buying the underlying shares (when the futures contracts are sold when they are overvalued) will generate some gains to buffer losses. Without arbitrage, the futures price could deviate significantly from the fair price, causing hedgers to avoid using futures markets because of poor hedging results and the uncertainty of the pricing process.

The pricing of futures contracts and arbitrage between futures and cash are closely