



**UNIVERSITI PUTRA MALAYSIA**

**SECURITY IMPROVEMENT OF UNICAST MANAGEMENT FRAMES IN  
IEEE 802.11 MAC LAYER**

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**SECURITY IMPROVEMENT OF UNICAST MANAGEMENT FRAMES IN  
IEEE 802.11 MAC LAYER**

**By**

**MINA MALEKZADEH**

**Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies, Universiti Putra Malaysia,  
in Fulfilment of the Requirement for the Degree of Master of Science**

**August 2007**



## DEDICATION

*To my mother and my father*

*Who my love to them is never ending*

*My husband Hadi and my children Zahra and Reza*

*Who I am nothing without them*



Abstract of thesis presented to the Senate of Universiti Putra Malaysia in fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Science

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**Chairman: Associate Professor Abdul Azim Abdul Ghani, PhD**

**Faculty: Computer Science and Information Technology**

Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) or IEEE 802.11, was formed in 1990 to exchange information by using radio frequency rather than wires. This standard transmits information by three types of frame: data frame, control frame, and management frame.

To provide security for WLANs, different security protocols have been designed such as: wired equivalent privacy (WEP), wifi protected access (WPA), and the strongest one, IEEE 802.11i (WPA2). Unfortunately all of the mentioned protocols provide security only for data frame. Control and management frames are transmitted without any protection even in IEEE 802.11i. The lack of protection on management frames causes an intruder to launch different types of attack on the WLAN such as forgery, session hijacking, denial of service and man-in-the-middle attack, which can lead to expose the whole WLAN.

To address the problem, this thesis proposes and evaluates a new per frame security model which is called Management Frame with Integrity and Authentication (MFIA)



to authenticate transmitted management frames. The proposed model uses a secret key and a new random sequence number (RSN) to secure communication between devices in WLAN and to prevent intruder from exposing the WLAN. The proposed model checks the authentication of a sender and the integrity of the management frames.

The proposed model has been evaluated by quantifying the probability of finding a proper RSN by intruder, probability of different current common attacks on management frames, and also required time for the specified attacks. The results show that MFIA provides a high security level for management frames in all IEEE 802.11 standards. Required times to launch the attacks, show that allocating the specified time by intruder is almost impossible in the proposed model so that makes the mentioned attacks impractical. Results also show the proposed model can prevent a variety of attacks on management frames.



Sebagai memenuhi keperluan untuk Ijazah Master Sains

**PENAMBAHBAIKAN KESELAMATAN KERANGKA PENGURUSAN  
DALAM LAPISAN MAC IEEE 802.11**

Oleh

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Rangkaian Kawasan Setempat Tanpa Wayar (WLAN) atau IEEE 802.11 dibentuk dalam tahun 1990 untuk pertukaran maklumat dengan menggunakan frekuensi radio bukannya wayar. Piawai ini menghantar maklumat dengan tiga jenis kerangka: kerangka data, kerangka kawalan, dan kerangka pengurusan.

Untuk menyediakan keselamatan bagi WLAN, protokol keselamatan berbeza telah direka bentuk seperti: *wired equivalent privacy (WEP)*, *wifi protected access (WPA)*, dan yang terkukuh, IEEE 802.11i (WPA2). Malangnya semua protokol yang dinyatakan menyediakan keselamatan hanya untuk kerangka data. Kerangka kawalan dan pengurusan dihantar tanpa sebarang perlindungan walaupun dalam IEEE 802,11i. Kekurangan perlindungan ke atas kerangka pengurusan menyebabkan penceroboh melancarkan pelbagai jenis serangan ke atas WLAN seperti pemalsuan, merampas sesi, penafian perkhidmatan, dan serangan orang-tengah yang mendedahkan keseluruhan WLAN.

Untuk mengatasi masalah ini, tesis ini mencadang dan menilai model keselamatan per kerangka yang dipanggil *Management Frame with Integrity and Authentication*



(*MFIA*) untuk mengesah kerangka pengurusan yang dihantar. Model cadangan menggunakan satu kunci rahsia dan nombor jujukan rawak (RSN) untuk melindungi komunikasi diantara peranti dalam WLAN dan menghalang penceroboh daripada mendedahkan WLAN. Model cadangan memeriksa ketulenan penghantar dan integriti kerangka pengurusan.

Model cadangan telah dinilai dengan cara mengkuantitikan keberangkalian untuk mencari RSN yang wajar oleh penceroboh, keberangkalian pelbagai serangan yang biasa ke atas kerangka pengurusan, dan juga masa yang diperlukan untuk serangan tertentu. Keputusan menunjukkan *MFIA* menyediakan peringkat keselamatan yang tinggi untuk kerangka pengurusan dalam semua piawai IEEE 802.11. Masa yang diperlukan untuk melancar serangan, menunjukkan bahawa memperuntukkan masa tertentu oleh penceroboh adalah hampir mustahil dalam model cadangan yang menyebabkan serangan tersebut tidak praktikal. Keputusan juga menunjukkan model cadangan dapat menghalang pelbagai serangan ke atas kerangka pengurusan.

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I certify that an Examination Committee has met on 14<sup>th</sup> August 2007 to conduct the final examination of Mina Malekzadeh on her Master of Science thesis entitled "Security Improvement of Unicast Management Frames in IEEE 802.11 Medium Access Control Layer" in accordance with Universiti Pertanian Malaysia (Higher Degree) Act 1980 and Universiti Pertanian Malaysia (Higher Degree) Regulations 1981. The Committee recommends that the student be awarded the degree of Master of Science.

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## **DECLARATION**

I hereby declare that the thesis is based on my original work except for quotations and citations which have been duly acknowledged. I also declare that it has not been previously or concurrently submitted for any other degree at UPM or other institutions.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
AP	Access Point
BSS	Basic Service Set
CCK	Complementary Code Keying
CRC	Cyclic Redundancy Check
DSSS	Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum
ESS	Extended Service Set
EAP	Extensible Authentication Protocol
FHSS	Frequency Hopping Spreading Spectrum
IEEE	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
ISM	Industrial Science Medicine, refers to 2.4 GHz unlicensed Frequency band
MAC	Message Authentication Code
MFIA	Management frame with Integrity and Authenticity
OFDM	Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
TKIP	Temporal Key Integrity Protocol
UNII	Unlicensed National Information Infrastructure, refers to 5 GHz Unlicensed Frequency Band
WEP	Wired Equivalent Privacy
WPA	Wireless Protected Access



# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Background

Over the past several years, wireless technology has changed the way people communicate. In particular, the wireless network technology has become so popular that it has already been accepted as an easy alternative to wired networks. Some of the advantages of the wireless network technology are: available network access without wires everywhere, high data rates, and less price in contrast to wired networks.

Among the wireless network technologies, Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) or IEEE 802.11 is more popular. The IEEE 802.11 working group was formed in 1990 and its goal was to create a WLAN that operates in one of the Industrial, Scientific, and Medical (ISM) frequency ranges.

The first IEEE 802.11 standard was released in 1997 (Henley, 2000) and after that three other standards IEEE 802.11a,b, and g were released. IEEE 802.11 uses radio frequency to transmit and receive data over the air by exchanging three kinds of frame: control, data and management frame.

With rapidly growing of the WLANs, security is very important for a safe communication between wireless stations. Therefore different protocols have been



designed to provide security for all IEEE 802.11 standards.

Unfortunately these protocols only put much attention on securing data frames, and less on securing management frames and control frames. Currently, management frames use Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC-32 bit) algorithm for security but CRC is useful only for unintentional error detection of the management frames and can not provide any security in form of authentication or privacy.

Hence an unprotected management frame can be used by intruder to start different attacks like injecting new forgery management frames, modify existing management frames, denial of service attack and other kinds of attack on management frames to break into the whole WLAN.

Thereby, this thesis presents a new model to provide a strong security mechanism to avoid possible common attacks on management frames, which is called Management Frame with Integrity and Authentication (MFIA).

## **1.2 Problem Statements**

IEEE 802.11 provides strong security for data frames but control and management frames are transmitted without any protection. Management frames are transmitted in form of request and response. This means, a sender transmits management frame request and then receives related management frame response. Whereas control frames are transmitted as exchanging for data frames. Control frames do not carry



important information and generally they are used to acknowledge data frames. Since management frames do not apply any control frame in their transmission (ANSI IEEE 802.11, 1999) therefore this research attempts to propose a new model to provide sufficient security for management frames.

The current security for management frames is CRC algorithm which can not protect management frames against malicious attacks (Sood and Eszenyi, 2006; Bellardo and Savage, 2003). Hence, the following problems on management frames have been identified:

- Management frames will be accepted easily by the receiver who carries out the specified function of the management frame without checking whether the sender is a legitimate user or if the management frame has not been modified during transmission. In this situation an intruder can easily spoof these frames and send forgery management frames as an authorized user to launch different kinds of attack.
- There is a sequence number field in the header of management frames. This field is a sequential number and it ranges from 0 to 4095 and gets reset every time the station restarts. The sequence numbers are predictable and are not encrypted. Therefore with knowledge of the current sequence number, the adversary can easily set a proper sequence number for his forgery management frames (Wright, 2003).



### **1.3 Objectives of the Research**

This research has two objectives:

- To design and implement a new model to provide a strong security for management frames in WLAN. This proposed model has two main functions: authentication of the sender and integrity of the management frame. In case of a successful authentication and integrity, the receiver will accept the original management frame. Any problem during authentication and integrity process causes the receiver to assume there is an attack on the management frame and discards it.
- To add a new Random Sequence Number (RSN) to avoid an intruder easily set a proper sequence number for his forgery management frame. The proposed model produces a random sequence number to make the MFIA more difficult to figure out by an intruder. This means an intruder will need more attempt in guessing the correct value of the random sequence number therefore makes the proposed model stronger.

### **1.4 Scope of the Research**

This research considers unicast management frames to protect. They are chosen because currently the most important problems of the management frames are forgery and collision attacks which are basis of other types of attack. On the other hands these two important attacks can be started just by using unicast management

frames because of their specified functions. Unicast management frames can be used by intruder to change one of the addresses in their header to use the functions. For example by changing the destination address in the header of a disassociation management frame to a broadcast address intruder can force all the stations in the WLAN to be disconnected from the network.

Hence an unprotected unicast management frames provide a powerful arsenal to an attacker, who can discover the layout of the network, find the location of devices and start more successful denial-of-service attacks against a network (Epstein, 2006; Wright, 2007).

But role of the broadcast management frames is different and they are rarely used. These frames typically are used to adjust radio frequency properties or find a proper access point for stations, rather than report sensitive information (Epstein, 2006; Wright, 2007 ).

## **1.5 Thesis Organization**

This thesis is divided into 6 chapters. The first chapter shows a background of the problem that this research tries to solve. The objectives of this research are also stated in this chapter.

Chapter 2 provides an introduction to IEEE 802.11 topologies and standards. It explains the two basic wireless network layers, physical and medium access control



layer, and different techniques for transmission data over these two layers. It also discusses all kinds of wireless network frame and their functions.

Chapter 3 explains existing security protocols in IEEE 802.11 medium access control layer. It presents security process; authentication, confidentiality and integrity, in the mentioned protocols. It shows the current algorithm to protect management frame and also describes common current security threats and vulnerabilities on management frames. This chapter shows related works that have been done before in relation to the problem of management frames.

In chapter 4 the proposed model is introduced to improve and enhance security of the management frames and then the proposed model will be simulated by a program in JavaScript and HTML. Step taken in the source code of the program also is shown in this chapter.

In chapter 5, first the proposed model will be implemented to show its correctness and after that it will be evaluated to show its effectiveness to enhance the security of the wireless networks, and then a comparison between the proposed model and current algorithm (CRC) will be discussed. It also will show the result of the comparison of the proposed model against the current algorithm and will discuss the probability of different kinds of common attack on them.

Conclusion will be discussed in chapter 6 and it explains the strength of the



proposed model to prevent a variety of common attacks related to management frames and then it proves the proposed model can enhance the security of the entire WLAN. Finally it states the contributions of this research and suggests future works to improve security of WLANs.





## CHAPTER 2

### IEEE 802.11 MEDIUM ACCESS CONTROL LAYER


This chapter provides descriptions of WLAN topologies and its standards and also describes IEEE 802.11 layers with their related frames.

#### 2.1 IEEE 802.11 Topologies

Two network topologies are defined in the IEEE 802.11: infrastructure network and Ad-Hoc network (Arbaugh et al., 2001). In fact, the difference between them is only in how the devices communicate to each other.

##### 2.1.1 Infrastructure Network

An infrastructure WLAN (which is the focus of this thesis) consists of several clients talking to an Access Point (AP) which is usually connected to a wired network like home LAN. IEEE 802.11 is based on a cellular architecture where the system is subdivided into cells. Each cell called Basic Service Set (BSS) which is controlled by an AP. So infrastructure mode of operation also is called a BSS (Xiao et al., 2004). This is shown in Figure 2.1.



**Figure 2.1: Infrastructure Network**